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Accidents Do Happen: Hazardous
Technology and International Tort
Litigation*

Stephen C. McCaffrey**

INTRODUCTION

More than three years ago, what has been described as the most
tragic industrial disaster in history' claimed the lives of well over
2,000 people and seriously injured upwards of 20,000 more in Bhopal,
India. 2 It is a sad commentary on the effectiveness of the law on
i

Copyright Q 1987 Stephen C. McCaffrey. This article is part of a larger study entitled
"Expediting the Provision of Compensation to Accident Victims," which will appear as a
chapter in a forthcoming book edited by Professors Guenther Handi and Robert Lutz, The Transfer
of Hazardous Substances and Technology: The International Legal Challenge.
** Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. B.A., University of Colorado; J.D., University of California (Berkeley) School of Law; Dr. Jur.,
University of Cologne. Member, United Nations International Law Commission.
The author would like to thank Ms. Carly Hegle, McGeorge School. of Law, class of 1986,
and Ms. Ruth Nunez-Schaldach, McGeorge Reference Librarian, for their helpful assistance
in connection with the preparation of this article. He also wishes to express his appreciation
to Professor Daniel Magraw, David Gill, Esq., and Mr. Harris Gleckman, who were kind
enough to comment upon drafts of the article. The author is, of course, solely responsible for
any errors.
1. See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India, 634 F. Supp.
842, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd in part sub nom. Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster v.
Union Carbide Corp., 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987).
2. Estimates of the number of dead range from 2,100 to 2,700. See Id. at 844 (2,100);
10 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 148 (April 8, 1987) (reporting that the Indian government estimated
that 2,374 people had died as a result of the accident); and Stille, "A Sense of Dharma,"
NAT'L L.J., Feb. 29, 1988, at 1, cal. 1 (2,700).
The number of people seriously injured by the gas leak at Bhopal is so vast that estimates
range from 10,000 to 40,000. See, e.g., 11 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 3 (Jan. 13, 1988) (20,000);
Miller, Two Years After Bhopal's Gas Disaster,LingeringEffects Still Plague its People, Wall
St. J., Dec. 5, 1986, at 30, cal. 2 (30-40,000); and Stille, supra, at 44 (reporting that Union
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both the national and international levels that it took two years and
the expenditure of over $25 million in legal costs alone simply to
identify the proper forum for suits arising out of the disaster. The
quest for a forum was probably not facilitated by the prevailing
confusion as to who could properly represent the hundreds of thousands of victims. 4 Most importantly, the victims' claims have yet to
be resolved~s
After reviewing briefly the principal obstacles to obtaining relief
for victims of such disasters through the courts, this article will
suggest ways in which the provision of relief to victims might be
expedited both within and outside of the litigation process. The
article concludes that action must be taken, preferably on the stateto-state level, to ensure that a regime for expediting the provision of
relief is in place before a disaster involving hazardous substances or
technology strikes again. Throughout the article, the natural or legal
person exporting hazardous substance or technology will be referred
to as the "exporter" and, for convenience, the country into which
the substance or technology is imported will be referred to as the
"importing" or "host country," regardless of whether the actual
importer is a government or a person.
OBSTACLES TO OBTAINNG RELIEF
Experience has shown only too clearly that if victims of mass
disasters are left with no alternative but to seek redress through the
I.

Carbide's attorney puts the number of seriously injured at 10,000). The number is multiplied
many times if all injured persons are included, regardless of the severity of the injury. For
example, the U.S. Federal District Court that tried the consolidated actions against Union
Carbide found that "[o]ver 200,000 people suffered injuries-some serious and permanentsome mild and temporary." In re Union Carbide, 634 F. Supp. at 844. Moreover, "1l]ivestock
were killed and crops damaged. Businesses were interrupted." Id. The facts of the Bhopal

incident are summarized in the District Court's opinion, id., at 845.
3. Draft Memorandum by Timothy B. Atkeson, of the Washington, D.C. bar, appended
as Attachment 4 to paper delivered by Timothy W. Stanley, Chairman, International Economic
Policy Association, The Impact of Transnational Liability on Investment Flows and Trade
Competitiveness, at panel on Hazardous Products and Technologies in Transnational Business,

Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association's Section of International Law & Practice
(Aug. 12, 1986).
4. On March 29, 1985, the government of India enacted legislation providing that India
had the exclusive right to represent Indian plaintiffs in India and elsewhere. See India: Bhopal
Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, 1985, reprinted in 25 INT'L LEanA. MATERILs

884 (1986). Pursuant to that legislation, India filed a complaint in the same U.S. court to
which the 145 actions that had been brought by American lawyers had been assigned, thus
creating considerable confusion as to who could properly represent the plaintiffs.

5.

Approximately 200,000 plaintiffs were involved in the U.S. litigation, and nearly

500,000 claims had been filed in India as of December 1986. In re Union Carbide, 634 F.
Supp. at 845.
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courts, the process of obtaining relief will be slow and expensive,
with a good portion of any recovery being eaten up by court costs

and attorneys' fees. 6 And yet legal redress through the courts has in
fact been the only recourse available as a practical matter in the
most notorious cases involving toxic substances or hazardous tech-

nology. 7 Other dispute-settlement methods have been proposed, 8 but

6. As to the delay and legal costs in the case of the Bhopal disaster, see supra text
accompanying notes 1-5. As to the suit filed in Bhopal district court, "no one suggests that
the entire process could be completed in less than four years if the case is tried and goes
through all levels of appeal. And most knowledgeable observers suggest that eight to ten years
is a more likely span-if all goes well." Adler, Bhopal Justice Watch: Can Michael Ciresi
Make the Best of a Bad Forum?, 71 AM. LAW. 34, 34.
With respect to the 1976 chemical plant explosion at Seveso, Italy, see Salzburger Zeitung,
July 11, 1986, at 48, col. 4, indicating that 10 years after the accident, the victims had not
received any compensation from the responsible company.
The story is the same in other cases involving large numbers of victims. In the recent U.S.
cases involving injuries from asbestos, for example, "[o]nly 37 percent of the compensation
demanded ... from 1980 to 1982 actually got to the victims: legal fees and expenses drained
off the other 63 percent-and many years elapsed before victims received any compensation
at all." Stein, Paying Bhopal Victims, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1984, at 35, col. 3. Victims of
the Amoco.Cadiz oil spill had to wait nearly ten years for a judgment ordering Amoco Corp.
to pay $85.2 million in damages-an award they considered unsatisfactory. See In re Oil Spill
by the Amoco Cadiz off the Coast of France on March 16, 1978, MDL No. 376, slip op.
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 1988); Conlon, Amoco Ordered to Pay $85 Million for '78 Oil Spill,
Sacramento Bee, Jan. 12, 1988, at 1, col. 1. Plaintiffs in the case, as of 1984, had reportedly
paid nearly $I0 million in legal fees. Smets, Compensation of EnvironmentalDamage Caused
by Non-Nuclear Industrial Activities, note 30, (mimeo, OECD, (1984)) (on file at The
TransnationalLawyer) [hereinafter Smets, Compensation of EnvironmentalDamage]. See also
a more general study by the same author, H. Smets, Indemnisation des dommages exceptionneis
6 1'environnement causbs par lra activits industrielles, in HAGuE AcADmm oF INTmNATiONAL
LAW & UNITED NATioNs UNIws=, THE FuTuRE oF ma INTERNATIONAL LAW OF TEE
ENvmoNimT 275, Workshop, The Hague, Nov. 12-14, 1984 (R.-J. Dupuy ed. 1985) [hereinafter Smets, Indemnisation des dommages].
7. With regard to the Seveso accident, see supra.note 6. In the Bhopal case, the Indian
government did undertake to provide some financial relief, but this effort has been severely
handicapped by, inter alia, problems with the identification of victims. Kramer, For Bhopal
Survivors, Recovery is Agonizing, Illneses are Insidious, Wall St. J., Apr. 1, 1985, at 1, col.
1. Settlement negotiations between the government of India and Union Carbide were not
fruitful. See e.g., 10 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 148 (8 Apr. 1987). But cf. the situation in the
case of the Rhine chemical spill of November, 1986, where Sandoz officials stated that the"
company would pay "proven claims" resulting from the spill at its Basel plant. Recently,
France settled with Sandoz in the amount of $7.6 million. 10 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 492
(Oct. 14, 1987). The Swiss government has established an interhal claims procedure and,
according to some press accounts, has accepted responsibility for the spill. S.F. Chron., Nov.
13, 1986, at 21; Financial Times (London), Nov. 14, 1986, at 1, col. 3; and Saciamento Bee,
Nov. 14, 1986, at A23. See also editorial, Taking the Rap on the Rhine, N.Y. Times, Nov.
18, 1986, at 26, col. 1. The German insurance carrier of the Sandoz company stated that
actual damages were believed to be less than $60 million, and that Sandoz' maximum coverage
would be five times that amdunt. Sacramento Bee, Nov. 14, 1986, at A23; Cf. federal
legislation proposed to provide relief outside the courts for asbestos related death and disability,
cited infra note 11.
8. Bilder, A Lump-Sum Settlement for Bhopal, Washington Post, Jan. 3, 1985 at A19;
Stein, supra note 6, at 35, col. 3; Magraw, The Bhopal Disaster.Structuring a Solution, 57
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like the litigation approach, they are post hoc in nature and must

inevitably begin dealing with the case at a stage when it is already
in a confrontational posture.
In short, it is arguable that any means of obtaining compensation
for victims that is not initiated until after the accident 9 will not be
expeditious 0 precisely because the parties are thrown into a posture
of dispute-settlement. The victims will want swift relief but will not
wish to sacrifice adequacy of compensation-as they see it-to get
it; the "defendant" company will doubtless wish to preserve good

relations with the host country, if any (as well as other potential
host countries), but its generosity will be tempered by its responsibility
to its stockholders. Although judicial relief has the presumptive Virtue
of according the parties the full panoply of due process protections,

and while the victims might eventually obtain a higher award from
a court than through a pre-arranged compensation mechanism, it is
questionable whether these are net advantages, given the delays and
siphoning-off of recovery that are inherent in the litigation process."
U. CoLo. L. REv. 835 (1985-86); and Nanda, For Whom the Bell Tolls in the Aftermath of
the Bhopal Tragedy: Reflections on Forum Non Conveniens and Alternative Methods of
Resolving the Bhopal Dispute, 15 DEN. J.INT'L L. & PoL'Y 235 (1987). Like Bilder, Stein
suggests a nonlitigation strategy aimed at "maximiz[ing] the return to the victims in the shortest
amount of time while minimizing the costs to third parties." Stein, supra note 6, at 35.
Similarly, Nanda urges that alternative dispute resolution techniques such as mediation and
conciliation be tried to resolve the Bhopal conflict without further delay. Nanda, supra, at
253.
Magraw "proposes a structure for resolving the Bhopal litigation" which, however, is
intended to provide a model "if similar disasters occur in the future, as seems certain."
Magraw, supra, at 837-38 (footnote omitted). The proposal envisions, inter alia, an agreement
between the United States and India, whereunder India would "expropriate all claims arising
from the Bhopal disaster" (id. at 844); the establishment in India, by India and the U.S., of
a special claims settlement tribunal which would determine expeditiously the amount of each
claim (id. at 846); the payment to India by Carbide (U.S.) and Carbide (India) of "a lump
sum in full and final settlement of all claims against the Union Carbide group of companies
related to the Bhopal disaster, with the exception of [specified individual claims]" (id. at 847);
and the distribution of the lump sum, "without deduction for any tribunal expenses, by India
to the claimants ... in accordance with the determinations of the tribunal" (id. at 846).
9. Tilfe old adage, "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure" applies not only
to relief efforts but also - and more importantly - to the entire issue of chemical plant safety.
Note, Chemical Plant Safety Regulation: The EuropeanExample, 16 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
621 (1984). In contrast to the prevention-oriented approach of the European Community's
"Seveso Directive" [5 0.J. Eon. Comm. (No. L 230) 1 (1982)], "U.S. federal legislation in
this area is largely response-oriented . . .." Id.
10. This is by no means meant to deny that the methods proposed by Messrs Bilder,
supra note 8 and Stein, supra note 6, would in all likelihood be more expeditious than the
judicial avenue.
I1. This is the position taken by Bilder, supra note 6,and Stein, id. See also Lewin,
Faster Settling of Mass Claims, N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1984, at D2, col. 1; S.2708, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1984) (A bill to provide prompt, exclusive, and equitable compensation, as a substitute
for inadequate tort remedies, for disabilities or deaths resulting from occupational exposure
to asbestos, and for other purposes); and H.R. 5966, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (companion
bill to S.2708).
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Nonetheless, while adjudication may not be the speediest or even
the most effective avenue of relief, it is not at all certain that

claimants could be precluded from taking recourse to litigation in a
case involving more than one country.' 2 Thus, the possibility that
victims will seek redress through the courts-either to gain supplemental recoveries or because of the non-existence, inapplicability, or
inefficacy of any pre-arranged compensation system-cannot be ig-

nored. Consequently, any solution to the problem of ensuring the
efficient provision of rapid and adequate compensation must address
obstacles inherent in the judicial process in addition to suggesting
new forms of anticipatory compensation schemes. This part of the
article will therefore review in summary fashion the principal features
of transnational mass diaster litigation' 3 that are likely to delay the
provision of coimpensation to victims, with a. view to identifying
areas of needed reform. Part I will conclude with a discussion of
several additional aspects of the litigation process that should be

addressed in order to compensate victims more equitably and expeditiously.
Factors tending to impede the provision of relief to victims through
the courts may be grouped according to whether they operate before,
during, or after a trial. An obvious pre-trial consideration is whether

affordable legal representation is available. Victims of a mass disaster
caused by hazardous technology are all too likely to be unable to
afford legal representation.14 If that is the case, they will be forced

to rely upon publicly funded legal aid'5 or representation on a

12. See infra notei 50-51 and accompanying text. Mention should also be made of the
Amoco Cadiz litigation, which was brought in U.S. federal court, outside the compensation
scheme provided by the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage, infra note 70, reportedly because of the inadequate compensation provided for under
the 1969 Convention. Smets, Compensation of Environmental Damage, supra note 6, at 12.
The judgment in the liability phase of the proceedings is reported in 3 Am. Mar. Cases 2123
(1984). For the judgment in the daihages phase, see supra note 6.
13. Mny of the factors discussed are not unique to a case involving the transfer of
hazardous technology, and some would be. present in a wholly domestic lawsuit.
14. In his opinion in the U.S. Bhopal litigation, Judge Keenan observed that "the lack
of contingency fees is not an insurmountable barrier to filing claims in India, as demonstrated
by the fact that more than 4,000 suits have been filed by victims of the Bhopal gas leak in
India, already." In re Union Carbide, 634 F'. Supp. at 851, reprinted in 25 INT'L LEaOAL
MA-mups at 781.
15. In the case of the Bhopal disaster, Indian legal aid committees filed a large number
of cases against both Carbide India and the Indian government. Dhavan, For Whom? And
For WhatReflections on the Legal Aftermath of Bhopal, 20 Tax. INT'L L.J. 295, 299 (1985).
Concerning legal aid in India generally, see Galanter, Legal Torpor. Why So Little Has
Happenedin India After the Bhopal Tragedy, 20 Tax. INT'L L. J. 273 (1985). Dhavan reports
that "[t]he Madyha Pradesh Congress (I) Legal Aid Committee filed 120 cases against Union
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contingent fee basis,' 6 if either is available. If neither is available,
which is not unlikely, 17 plaintiffs may be left with no effective judicial
recourse.'
Nor can other litigation "costs"

such as India,

9

be forgotten. Some countries,

impose an ad valorem court fee upon plaintiffs. If

not waived, such a fee would raise the cost of recourse through the
courts, and might even make it impossible for an impecunious victim

Carbide," and that "the new Supreme Court public interest law procedure was used to file
cases before the Supreme Court against the Indian government," seeking damages as well as
interim relief. These actions have apparently been preempted by the Claims Act which was
passed by the Indian government on 18 Mar. 1985 and came into force on 29 Mar. 1985. See
Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, supra note 4, at 884; Galanter, supra
at 290, text at note 84. The Claims Act itself, while reserving to the Central Government "the
exclusive right" to represent all claimants in any action anywhere in the world (§ 3), does
allow any claimant to retain, at his or her own expense, "a legal practitioner ... to be
associated in the conduct [by the government] of any suit or other proceeding relating to his
claim." Id. at 885.
Despite the fact that legal aid for Bhopal victims is at least theoretically available in India,
one Indian observer who has worked extensively in Bhopal since the accident has been quoted
as saying that it is "far-fetched" to expect that the poor will receive justice in India. 9 Int'l
Env't Rep. (BNA) 343 (Oct. 8, 1986).
16. Most authorities agree that the contingent fee is an institution which, if not uniquely
American, at least thrives there far better than anywhere else. Such arrangements are condemned
not only by most civil law countries, but also in England. See R. SCHLESINoER, CoMaAAv
LAw 343-88 (4th ed. 1980); W. KA1BACH, Les barreaux dans le monde 156 (1959). This does
not necessarily mean, however, that a contingent fee arrangement, valid under the law of state
X, will not be enforced in state Y by a court applying the law of state X. See, e.g., Judgment
of Nov. 15, 1956, Bundesgerichtshof, BGHZ, W.Ger., 22 Bundesgerichtshof in Zivilsachen
162 (enforcement of contingent fee, valid under the law of the District of Columbia where
attorney's office located, not contra bonos mores in Germany).
The American lawyers offering to represent Bhopal victims on a contingent fee basis have
been variously described as "vultures' preying on the victims' misfortune, and "private
attorneys general," who enhanced the victims' bargaining position and introduced into India
the notion of full accountability as of right. Compare, e.g., Frank, Are Some Lawyers
Vultures? 71 A.B.A. J.Mar. 1985, at 17; Austern, Is Lawyer Solicitation of Bhopal Clients
Ethical? Legal Times, Jan. 21, 1985, at 16; and Bergman, The Scandal of U.S. Lawyers
Seeking Clients in Bhopal, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 17, 1985, at 1, col. 4; with Weinberg, Insights and
Ironies: The American Bhopal Cases, 20 Tnx. INr'L L.J. 307, 318-19 (1985); Galanter, supra
note 15, at 292-93; and McNally, Innocent Bystander, Milwaukee J. Dec. 31, 1984, at 11, col.
1. See also the first footnote of Judge Keenan's opinion in the U.S. Bhopal case. In re Union
Carbide, 634 F.Supp at 844, reprinted in 25 INrT'L LEoAI. MATERILS 773. "ITlhose members
of the American bar who travelled the 8,200 miles to Bhopal [during December 1984 and
January 1985] did little to better the American image in the Third World-or anywhere else."
Id.
17. As indicated, supra note 16, the contingent fee is for the most part a peculiarly
American institution. With regard to the availability of legal aid in different countries, see
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL Am AssocrATioN, DIEcTORY oF LEOAL AmiAND AnvicE FACIrITIES
AvAmABLE THaouGHouT mm WoRLD (1966).

18. Even if victims and their families were allowed to appear in pro per, they would have
great difficulty competing with the defendant(s) in the arena of complex litigation; indeed,
their lack of counsel would probably further delay any recovery.
19. Court Fees Act (VII of 1870), 6 IDlA A.I.R. MANuAL 1191 (3d ed. 1970). "The Act
provides that if a citizen wants to bring a civil case, he must pay a fee, typically by putting
stamps on the complaint." Galanter, supra note 15, at 274.
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to seek a substantial recovery.2 0 Rules concerning the awarding of
attorneys' fees and costs may also operate to keep victims out of the
courts. "The legal system of the United States stands virtually alone
in rejecting the general principle of 'loser pays all."' 2' Even if
somewhat remote, the possibility of being ordered to pay the costs
and attorneys' fees of the prevailing party is bound to have a deterrent
effect on the filing of large claims: Claims may be reduced in amount
or not filed at all, depending upon the likelihood of success in the

action (including jurisdictional problems, discussed below). This factor will thus play a highly significant role when claimants litigate in
virtually any forum but the United States, and may in fact figure
prominently in the forum-selection decision.2
A fourth pre-trial consideration, which would be applicable in only
some cases, is that of sovereign immunity. This factor could come
into play in a suit against either the exporter's home state or the
state in which the accident occurred,23 and could constitute a bar to

actions against such defendants (including state agencies or, instrumentalities).74
20. As might be expected, it has been concluded that in India, .the fee "dissuades claimants
from filing large claims." Dhavan, supra note 15, at 297. See also Galanter, supra note 15,
at 274-75. "[Tjhe British colonial rulers of India were convinced that Indians were too litigious.
To restrain litigation, they decided to make people pay to use the courts." Id. at 274. While
"the chances of the court fee being waived for the indigent victims of a disaster are extremely
high" in India (Dhavan, supranote 15, at 300), as was in fact done in the Bhopal case, the
mere existence of the fee is bound to have some deterrent effect on the filing of claims. In
any event, seeking a waiver would consume valuable time.
21. R. SCHiaSINGER, ComlARA.kv LAw 489-90 (3d ed. 1970). See also supra note 16, at
346, 665-66 (4th ed. 1980). Schlesinger points out that there are rare exceptions to the general
U.S. rule of allowing successful plaintiffs to recover attorney's fees. Id. at 666-67. These
exceptions, however, would not appear to be applicable to the kind of case under consideration.
The "American rule" regarding the assessment of attorney's fees does not necessarily mean
that a foreign judgment ordering the loser to pay the winner's costs-including attorney's
fees-will not be enforceable in the United States. See Peterson, Foreign Country Judgmehts
and The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws, 72 CoLum. L. Ray. 220, 254 (1972).
22. Robertson, .Introduction to the Bhopal Symposium, 20 Ix. Ie'L L.J. 269, 272
(1985).
23. There have been suggestions in the Bhopal case, for example, that the government of
India, and perhaps that of Madhya Pradesh, the Indian state of which Bhopal is the capital,
are at least partially responsible for the disaster. "It is possible to argue that the officers of
the Indian Government were either guilty of negligence or breach of their statutory duty
relating to the inspection and maintenance of the plant. The Indian Government had been
warned by its own officers not to locate the plant so close to the town." Dhavan, supra note
15, at 302-03. See also 9 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 343 (Oct. 8, 1986). For its part, Union
Carbide has countersued the Indian government, "claiming it and the Madhya Pradesh state
government were responsible for the deaths and injuries resulting from the chemical leak
[because they] had allowed shanty dwellers to settle around the factory even though they knew
of the dangers involved in the chemical processes used at the Bhopal plant." Sacramento Bee,
Nov. 18, 1986, at A6, col. 1.
24. Dhavan, supra note 15, at 303, text at note 46 (citing State of Rajasthan v. Mst.
Vidhyawati, 1962 A.I.R. (S.C.) 933 (India)); Kasturi Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1965
A.I.R. (S.C.) 1039 (India 1964).
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Even in the case of non-sovereign defendants, personal jurisdiction
may be difficult to acquire for victims of a Bhopal-like disaster. 2
The exporter will often be the target defendant, but may not be
subject to jurisdiction at the place where plaintiffs were injured.
Conversely, while a local subsidiary would most probably be amenable to jurisdiction at the situs of the accident, it may not have
sufficient assets to satisfy any eventual judgment. 26 One lesson of
the Bhopal litigation may be that suing at the exporter's home base
could be worthwhile even if the action is eventually transferred, in
effect, to the situs of the accident: Depending upon the conditions
of the transfer or dismissal, plaintiffs might in this way be able to
obtain jurisdiction over the foreign exporter and possibly increase
the likelihood that an eventual judgment would be enforceable in the
exporter's home country.2 7

Assertion of judicial jurisdiction over the subsidiary by local (in
the Bhopal case, Indian) courts would present no problem in countries
following either the civil or the common law system. 28 However, the
target defendant will probably be the parent company or foreign
exporter of the hazardous technology, not only because the parent
may have controlled the subsidiary, and may be responsible for, e.g.,
the defective design, process, or method of operation that led to the

25. See generally Weintraub, JurisdictionOver the Foreign Non-Sovereign Defendant, 19
SAN Dxaoo L. REv. 431 (1982); Comment, The Minimum Contacts Standard and Alien

Defendants, 12 L. & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 783 (1980).
26. Other factors may also play important roles in the process of deciding where and
whom to sue. As occurred in the Bhopal case, for example, plaintiffs may select a particular

defendant at least in part because they wish to sue in an especially attractive forum. See
generally infra note 31; see also infra note 46 (concerning the advantages of U.S. pre-trial
discovery); Schwartz, India Sues Union Carbide with Unique Complaint, Legal Times, May
6, 1985, at 25, col.1 (concerning the advantages of U.S. law relating to substantive bases for
relief and measure and type of damages).

27. Cf. Judge Keenan's conditional dismissal in the U.S. Bhopal case, requiring that: (I)
Union Carbide submit to the jurisdiction of Indian courts and waive any defense based upon
the statute of limitations; (2) Carbide agree to satisfy any Indian judgment providing that it
comport with minimal due process requirements; and (3) Carbide "be subject to discovery
under the model of the United States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . ..

."

In re Union

Carbide Corp., 634 F. Supp. at 867. The second and third conditions were reversed on appeal.
Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster v. Union Carbide Corp., 809 F.2d 195, 205-06 (2d
Cir. 1987).

28.

The subsidiary is incorporated under the laws of the forum state, has its plant there,

and has committed an allegedly tortious act in that jurisdiction which resulted in injuries to
local persons and property. In most states, any one of these contacts would provide a sufficient

relationship with the forum to allow it to exercise judicial jurisdiction over the defendant.
(REvisD) or THE FoRmGNc REx.ATioNs LAW oF Ta Um-Eib STATES, § 421 (Tent.
Final Draft 1985) [hereinafter FORmGN RELATIONS RESTATEMENT], which "sets forth some rules
and guidelines for the exercise of jurisdiction to adjudicate in cases having international
implications, applicable to courts both in the United States and in other states."
RESTATEmENT
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accident, 29 but also-and perhaps chiefly-because the parent will

have the deeper pocket. 30 Further, as in the Bhopal litigation, plaintiffs may wish to sue the parent in order to obtain the most attractive
forum. 3' Finally, it may be that no local subsidiary was involved, in
29. The complaint filed by the Union of India against Union Carbide in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York, for example, predicated Carbide's
responsibility on, inter alia, strict liability for an ultrahazardous activity, improper design,
construction, maintenance and operation of the plant, failure to warn of known risks,
negligence, breach of express and implied warranties, and misrepresentation. [Pending Litigation], Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.'Inst.) at 65870 (Oct. 1985). Not surprisingly, Carbide U.S.
has claimed that it only sold Carbide India the basic design package for the plant; it also
claims that the accident was due to sabotage. 10 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 45.46 (Feb. 11, 1987).
Claims against a foreign exporter of hazardous technology may be based upon one or more
of several different theories, depending on the facts of the case. See OECD, INTmwAXONAL
INvzsTrET AND MULTiNATIONAL ENnRpiusEs, RoPoNsIBmrry oF PARFNrr Comrims FOR
mEmm SuBsmmmEs (1980) (surveying the legal situation in OECD member countries); West-

brook, Theoriesof ParentCompany Liabilityand the Prospectsfor an InternationalSettlement,
20 TEx. INT'L L.J. 321, 330 (1985); and Schwartz, supra note 26, at 25. These theories include:
(1) vicarious liability of the parent for torts of the subsidiary; (2) direct liability of the parent
for its own negligence, for failure to warn of a known risk, or for operating an ultrahazardous
activity; (3) direct liability of the parent for defective products manufactured by the parent
and marketed or distributed through the subsidiary (or through an unrelated person or
organization); or (4) possibly even some novel theory, such as "multinational enterprise
liability," a doctrine advanced apparently for the first time in India's U.S. suit against Union
Carbide. See Schwartz, supra note 26, at 28-29 (discussion of "multinational enterprise
liability"); Westbrook, supra, at 324; and Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at 45-46 (Feb. 11,
1987). Schwartz classifies this theory as a form of vicarious liability. American lawyers
representing India in the suit in Bhopal district court explain that the theory "holds that a
company controlling a majority interest in an enterprise involved in manufacturing or handling
hazardous products has a 'non-delegable duty to assure that the activity does not cause harm."'
10 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 46 (Feb. 11, 1987). Mr. Bud G. Holman, counsel for Union
Carbide, has responded that "[t]he purported theory of multinational enterprise liability is
contrary to the principle that a parent corporation is not'liable for the torts of its subsidiaries
unless exceptional circumstances exist which justify piercing the veil." Holman, "The Litigation
Issues," paper presented at panel on "Hazardous Products and Technologies in Transnational
Business," Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association's Section of International Law
& Practice, Aug. 12, 1986, at 41 citing anno., 7 A.L.At.3d 1343.
30. In the Bhopal litigation, the Indian government urged "a district court in Bhopal to
restrain the Union Carbide Corporation from selling any more of its assets, saying such sales
could reduce any eventual settlement for victims of the 1984 gas tragedy." N. Y. Times, Nov.
2, 1986, at 6, col. 1. On Nov. 17, 1986, the Indian court "issued a temporary restraining
order blocking Union Carbide from selling any of its assets, paying dividends or taking other
measures in connection with asset sales." Sacramento Bee, Nov. 18, 1986, at A6, col. 1. And
on Nov. 28, 1986, the Indian government accepted Union Carbide's offer to maintain $3
billion in assets. Id. Nov. 30, 1986, at D4, col. 2.
31. For discussions of the attractiveness of the United States as a forum in the Bhopal
litigation, see Dhavan, supra note 15, passim; and Galanter, supra note 15, at 273. See also
the description of plaintiff's claims in that litigation, resisting Carbide's motion for dismissal
from a federal district court on forum non conveniens grounds, Union Carbide Corp: Gas
Plant Disaster v. Union Carbide Corp., 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987). In that case, Judge
Keenan cited the observations of the U.S. Supreme Court in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454
U.S. 235, 252 n.18 (1981), concerning "the liberality of United States federal law as compared
to much foreign law with respect to availability of strict liability for tort, malleable and diverse
choice of law rules among the 50 states, availability of jury trials, contingent fee arrangements
and extensive discovery provisions ... . In re Union Carbide Corp. India, 634 F. Supp. at
846.
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which case the foreign manufacturer or exporter may be the only

available defendant.
If suit is brought against a foreign entity having no direct presence
in the forum state, the question of jurisdiction over that entity is
almost certain to be challenged, costing victims time and money.
Even in the United States, which has shown perhaps the greatest
readiness to "pierce the corporate veil,"' 32 mere ownership of a

majority or even all of the subsidiary's stock would probably not be
enough by itself to allow the state in which the subsidiary is incorporated to assert jurisdiction over the parent. 3 On the other hand,
earlier reluctance of U.S. courts to reach a foreign parent through a
local subsidiary 4 has given way to a recognition that assertion of
jurisdiction over the foreign parent is permissible where the parent
so controls the subsidiary as to disregard its separate corporate
existence.35 Obviously, however, this theory would not be available

32. Professor Westbrook has written that "the 'piercing' doctrine is a murky one in
United States law, with a confused conceptual underpinning, and the comments of other
[authorities] do not lead us to expect a more coherent doctrine in Indian law. For this reason,
I doubt its usefulness in the determination of the parent's responsibility in the Bhopal disaster."
NMestbrook, supra note 29, at 323-24.
.While the courts of European countries have generally been much more conservative than
their American counterparts with regard to "piercing the corporate veil", the Court of Justice
of the European Communities has effectively reached through a local subsidiary to a foreign
parent in an antitrust case. See cases No. 6/73 and 7/73, Instituto Chemioterapico Italiano
S.p.A. & Commercial Solvents Corp. v. E.C. Comm'n, [1974 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) § 8209, 8800.
33. See, e.g., Cannon Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925);
Conn. v. ITT Aetna Finance Co., 105 R.I. 397, 252 A.2d 184 (1969). RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
Col rmcT OF LAWS § 52 comment b (1971) [hereafter CoNFi'cTs RESTATEMENT].
See also the decision of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
in an analogous case of marine oil pollution, specifically that resulting from the infamous
Amoco Cadiz spill. There, the court found that the parent corporation, Standard Oil of
Indiana, "exercised such control over its subsidiaries that those entities would be mere
instrumentalities," and accordingly found the parent "responsible for the tortious acts of its
wholly owned subsidiaries and instrumentalities." 7 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 129 (May 9, 1984).
For a comparative study of the law on this point in OECD countries (24 principally western
nations, including European and Nordic countries, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Canada,
the United States, and Turkey) see OECD, RE.PoNsmm=Y OF PARENT COMPANmS FOR THEIR
SUBSIIAnIas (1980).
34. See, e.g., authorities cited supra note 33.
35. See CoNrucTs RESTATEMENT, supra note 33, § 52 comment b. See generally Comment,
Jurisdiction over Parent Corporations,51 CALra. L. REv.574 (1963). For a discussion of the
criteria applicable to the determination of whether the subsidiary's separate corporate existence
has been maintained, see Public Admin. of County of N.Y. v. Royal Bank of Canada, 19
N.Y.2d 127, 224 N.E.2d 877, 879 (1967). See also Taca Int'l Airlines v. Rolls-Royce of
England Ltd., 15 N.Y.2d 97, 204 N.E.2d 329 (1965); Vitro Electronics v. Milgray Electronics,
Inc., 255 Md. 498, 258 A.2d 749 (1969); State ex rel. Grinnell Co. v. MacPherson, 62 N.M.
308, 309 P.2d 981 (1957), cert. denied 355 U.S. 825 (1957); ScoLEs & P. HAY, CoNXcT OF
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where it is claimed that plaintiff's injuries resulted from the foreign
corporation's failure to exercise adequate supervision and control
over a local subsidiary. 6 Still, plaintiff in such a case could seek to
hold the foreign corporation directly responsible if its failure to
supervise were negligent (i.e., where it had breached a duty of
supervision).
Whether jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer will lie in the
case of injuries caused by a defective product is a question whose
answer may depend upon where the suit is brought. While in the

European Community jurisdiction would lie at the place where the
injury occurred 3 7 this will often not be the case in the United States.
In the case of World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,38 for
example, the United States Supreme Court held that Oklahoma could
not exercise jurisdiction over the New York retailer or distributor of
an automobile in a products liability action to recover for injuries
sustained in an Oklahoma accident. The Court explained that it was
not enough that the defendants could have foreseen that the automobile would cause injury in Oklahoma. 39 The Court did indicate,
however, that it would be consistent with the Due Process Clause of
the U.S. Constitution to assert "personal jurisdiction over a [foreign]
corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce

LAWS 337 (1982).
It has been alleged in the U.S. Bhopal litigation that the parent, Union Carbide U.S., has
exercised a sufficient measure of control over its Indian subsidiary to give rise to the parent's
responsibility. See Plaintiff's Brief in Support of Motion to Transfer Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407, In re Disaster at Bhopal, India, MDL No. 626 (Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation, Dec. 21, 1984). See also Press, Bhopal: Battling for Business, Newsweek, Feb. 4,
1985, at 80.
See also W. Reese & M. Rosenberg, Conflict of Laws 128 (8th ed. 1984) (citing Florio v.
Powder Power Tool Corp., 248 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1957); Kahn v. Maco Co., 216 F.2d 233
(4th Cir. 1954)); Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 227 N.E.2d 851 (1967)).
36. See Westbrook, supra note 29, at 323. It has been suggested that the injuries at
Bhopal resulted from Union Carbide's failure to supervise adequately the local subsidiary. See,
e.g., N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1984, at Al, col. 2; Manchester Guardian, Dec. 16, 1984, at 1,
col. 1.
37. See 1968 European Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters, as amended by the Convention of Accession, art. 5(3), 21 O.J.
EuR. Comm. (No. L 304) 77 (1978), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH),
6003-79, reprintedin 18
Itrr'L LEAL MATERILS 21 (1979). See Bier v. Mines de Potasse, E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1735,
1748 (1976); 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 284, 301 (1977) (the interpretation of this provision by the
Court of Justice). If defendant is not domiciled in a contracting state, any rules of exorbitant
jurisdiction of the forum state may be used against it. EEC Convention on Jurisdiction, art.
4, § 2. See also infra note 44 and accompanying text.
38. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
39. Id. at 566. Otherwise, said the Court, "fe]very seller of chattels would in effect
appoint the chattel his agent for service of.process. His amenability to suit would travel with
the chattel." Id.
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with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the
forum state."' 4 But the viability of the "stream of commerce" theory
was cast into doubt by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Asahi
Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court.41 In Asahi, all nine
justices agreed that California lacked jurisdiction over a Japanese
manufacturer of a component part in an indemnification action by
a Taiwanese manufacturer, but disagreed as to how the "stream of
commerce" doctrine should be applied.
In view of the fact that the United States is a principal "home
country" of exporters of hazardous technology, 42 American jurisdictional rules take on importance for the enforcement in the U.S. of
a judgment rendered in an importing country. Such a judgment
would not be denied recognition and enforcement in the United
States for jurisdictional reasons if it were based on grounds comparable to those recognized as constitutional by the U.S. Supreme
Court. To take another example, the Federal Republic of Germany
gives plaintiff the option of suing either at the place of the tortious
act (e.g., sale of the defective product) or at the place where the
injury was suffered. 43 Indeed, one commentator has concluded that
German law affords a more extensive jurisdictional reach than is
available under American law, and that World-Wide Volkswagen
would have come out differently in Germany. This writer suggests
that, unlike the situation in the United States, a German court would

40. Id. at 567. See also Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1980); Poyner v.
Erma Werke GmbH, 618 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1980); Duple Motor Bodies Ltd. v. Hollingsworth,
417 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1969); Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d
57 (1969); Regie Nationale des Usines Renault v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. App. 2d 702, 25
Cal. Rptr. 530 (1962); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 II1. 2d 432,
176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). See also E. Sco.Es & P. HAY, supra note 35, at 338-39; Weintraub,
supra note 25, at 431; and Comment, supra note 25 at 783. But see Samuels v. BMW of

North America, Inc., 554 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Tex. 1983) (no jurisdiction over German
manufacturer where allegedly defective automobile sold in forum by "autonomous subsidiary");

cf. 208 Cal. App. 2d at 702.
41. 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987). See Weintraub, Asahi Sends Personal JurisdictionDown the
Tubes, 23 Tax. INTL L.J. 55 (1988).
42. Multinationals that export hazardous technology are headquartered principally, and

probably in roughly equal proportions, in Europe, the United States, and Japan. (A 1976
study states that 90 per cent of the world's multinationals are incorporated and headquartered

in the United States [Note, Control of Multinational Corporations' Foreign Activities, 15

L.J. 435, 436 (1976)], but this would now appear to be outdated.) Telephone
conversation with Harris Gleckman, Legal Officer, U.N. Center for Transnational Corporations, Jan. 22, 1987. A number of different legal regimes would therefore have to be studied
to ascertain whether there are common standards of "indirect" jurisdiction-i.e., bases of
jurisdiction utilized by the court whose judgment is presented for enforcement in another state.
43. See Zra, RozEBoRwNuNo [ZPO] § 32 (W. Ger.); OLG Harem, N.J.W. 58, 1831;
'WAsHBuRN

Neumann-Duesberg, N.J.W. 55, 696-98.
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have jurisdiction over the defendant where the only contact with
Germany was that the injury occurred there.M

The foregoing discussion indicates that it may be possible in some
cases for the courts of the importing country to assert personal
jurisdiction over the foreign exporting company. Even so, possible

problems of proof or other potential obstacles may cause the "importing" state to wish to have appropriate assurances of the exporting
company's amenability to jurisdiction. Furthermore, the facts necessary to support jurisdiction in the importing country would not be

present in many cases. A possible approach to providing jurisdictional
assurances is therefore discussed in part II, below.
Even if there is no jurisdictional problem (because, e.g., suit is
brought against the exporter at its home), the Bhopal case has

demonstrated only too dramatically that enormous amounts of time
and money can be expended on litigating the question of the proper
forum for the trial. 45
If American-style discovery is allowed, which it is usually not
outside the U.S., 46 additional time and claimant resources will be
consumed. This will be true even if discovery orders are confined to
the territorial jurisdiction of the court. A very real possibility, especially if American parties are involved, is that suit will be brought
in the United States principally to take advantage of liberal American
discovery rules. 47 While this tactic may result in the pre-trial produc-

44. See von Dryander, Jurisdictionin Civil and Commercial Matters Under the German
Code of Civil Procedure, 16 INr'L LAw. 671, 691 (1982).
45. See supra text accompanying note 3.
46. With respect to the lack of American-style ire-trial discovery in civil law countries,
see generally R. Scm.asiNGER, supra note 16, at 399-400.
By way of illustration of the general hostility to American-style discovery, mosts states
parties to the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial
Matters (done at The Hague 18 Mar. 1970) 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S.
231, reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781 (Supp. 1987) other than the United States, have declared
(as permitted by the Convention) that they will not execute Letters of Request "issued for the
purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents as known in"
Common Law countries."
See also the discussion of "blocking statutes," passed in response to the perceived intrusive
effects of discovery orders by U.S. courts, in RSTATEmen (Rmrisw) FonmwN RnErAnoNs LAw
oF Tan UNrrED STATEs § 437 (Tent. Fimal Draft 1985) reporfer's note 4.
47. Of course, there are many factors ... which determine a lawyer's choice [of
forum]; but ...the differences in the conduct of discovery loom larger than all the
other factors. Sometimes, a plaintiff engaged in litigation in a civil-law country will
go so far as to institute a second action here, without intending to bring the case
to trial in our courts, but merely for the purpose of obtaining the advantage of
American-style discovery.
R. ScmsnGER, supra note 16, at 400. In the Bhopal litigation, suit was initially brought in
the United States in large part because of the extensive discovery allowed there. See In re
Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster v. Union Carbide Corp., 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir.
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tion of revealing evidence, it is also likely to give rise to expensive
and time-consuming challenges regarding the appropriateness of the
chosen forum.
Consolidation of claims and appropriate representation of victims

present other potential obstacles. The handling of all claims resulting
from a mass disaster in a consolidated procedure results in obvious
economies. 4 Further, defendant would be likely to find it less difficult
to settle victims' claims if all victims were represented by one, or a
small group of individuals or entities. 49 But apart from the mechanics

of consolidating claims or lawsuits, there is the problem of representation of the class of victims and survivors.
Through specially-enacted legislation, the Indian government has
asserted the exclusive right to represent all claimants in the Bhopal

case "whether within or outside India. ' 5 0 But this law could not
operate extraterritorially to bar a court in another country from

entertaining a lawsuit by a victim (although the court could give it
effect voluntarily as a matter of comity, based on India's jurisdiction
to prescribe in respect of its nationals).5' Thus, absent a single
representative of all claimants, a defendant could not be certain that
there were no "holdouts"

who would make claims outside the

settlement process-a factor which could abort that process.

1987), reprinted in 25 INT'L LEGAL MATE XrAs 771, 776. Judge Keenan observed that, "To a
great extent, the plaintiffs in this case argue that Indian courts do not offer an adequate
forum for this litigation by virtue of the relative 'procedural and discovery deficiencies [which]
would thwart the victims' quest for justice."
48. See supra note 4, incieating that the 145 actions that were filed in the United States
in the wake of the Bhopal disaster were all joined and assigned to the federal district court
for the Southern District of New York. In re Union Carbide Corp., 634 F. Supp. 842, 845,
25 INT'L LEGAL MATEa iAs 771, at 773.
49. See, e.g., Bilder, supra note 8; Stein, supra note 6; and Lewin, supra note II.
50. Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, 1986, § 3, reprintedin 25 INT'L
LEGAL MATrmus at 884 (1986). See supra note 23 (discussion of Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster
Act). The power of the United States government (in particular, the President) to settle,
suspend or even extinguish claims has been upheld by U.S. courts in the context of the U.S.Iran hostage crisis and the related executive agreement which resolved it. See Dames & Moore
v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); and Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 690 F.2d 1010
(D.C. Cir. 1982).
51. See, e.g., FoRmGN RELAn-oNs REsTATEmENT, supra note 28, §§ 402, 403. As suggested
by the statement in the text in parenthesis, India would have jurisdiction to prescribe rules in
respect of the conduct of its nationals abroad, and to enforce such rules in India against such
nationals. See id. §§ 402, 403, 431.
Another approach has been suggested by Westbrook, who observes that Congress could
"adopt appropriate legislation giving India the status of representative parens patriae for the
victims [of the Bhopal disaster] with the power to bind them in a settlement." Westbrook,
supra note 29, at 330. This would hardly be possible in respect of every mass disaster involving
hazardous technology.
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Determination of which country's law is applicable is another
judicial task that could consume considerable time. This question is
often handled by pre-trial motion. Precisely because of the enormous
potential impact of the decision as to the applicable law, this question
is one which will be fully and strenuously litigated, again at high
cost in terms of time and money.
A dispute as to whether the defendant can be held strictly liable
or will be liable only for negligence may arise even after the court
has determined which state's law to apply.52 This may be a crucial
point in view of the difficulty in many cases of proving that an
accident involving high, technology was due to the "fault"

of a

particular individuai or entity.
During the trial itself, plaintiffs in cases involving sophistocated
technology are almost certain to face formidable problems of proof.53
It is true that this factor is not unique to cases involving hazardous
technology that is exported. Yet because of the foreign elements and
large number of victims involved, it is one that will be particularly
time-consuming. Some of the problems that are likely to arise in this
area are: Proof of foreign law,4 proof of fault and causation, and
identification of victims.
The latter has proven to be a very serious problem in the BhopaI
case55 with regard to both deceased and injured victims. Unfortunately, the outlook is probably about the same for most serious,
technology-related accidents in Third World countries. The problem
of representation could be avoided if the government were allowed
to sue in a parenspatriaecapacity; it could then distribute the funds
recovered outside the litigation process. But this would not solve the
ultimate difficulty of identifying those entitled to compensation, at

52. Indeed, it may arise at the stage of determining the appropriate forum. See e.g., In
re Union Carbide, 634 F. Supp. 842, 849-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), 25 IW'L LEGAlMAmnr.us 779.
53. The Bhopal case provides an apt illustration. There is still disagreement, for example,
on the fundamental question of how the accident happened. Possibilities range from routine
water washing (India's contention) to sabotage (Union Carbide's claim). Ste e.g., Stille, What
Really Caused the Gas Leak in Bhopafl Nat'l L.J., Feb. 29 1988, at 45, col. 1, reporting that
Carbide's lawyers "spent nearly a year in India building Carbide's sabotage defense." Id.
54. See R. Scmnsnmom, supra note 16, at 45-88. Schlesinger points out that under the
traditional common law approach, foreign law must be proved as a "fact" b, the party
relying upon it. while this rule has been relaxed somewhat (see, e.g., Fn. R. CIV. PRoc.
44.1), it is still the governing principle in many cases. In Germany, on the other hand,
ascertainment of foreign law is treated as a question of law, and is the responsibility of the
court. R. ScmassInam, supra note 16, at 65.
55. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 7 and Galanter, supra note 15, at 282-83. See also
supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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least when circumstances are such as they were at Bhopal.56 Perhaps
the best that can be done is to assure that a system is in place that
will make a sum of money available as quickly as possible to a
distribution mechanism on the scene, operated under the authority
of the local government, and leave it to that mechanism to determine
appropriate levels of compensation and to distribute the funds as
best it can.
Interlocutory appeals, which are allowed more readily in some legal
systems than in others, may result in further delay. "A recent Indian
Supreme Court opinion listed 15 types of orders that could be
appealed during trial." 57
Plaintiffs' troubles are not over even assuming they are able to
obtain a favorable judgment. If the judgment is rendered by a court
in a jurisdiction other than that in which defendant has assets
sufficient to satisfy the judgment, plaintiffs will have to seek to
enforce it at the situs of defendant's assets. Unfortunately, it is by
no means certain that this will be possible. While the trend internationally seems to be in favor of recognition and enforcement of a
foreign country judgment without examining the merits of the decision, practice among states varies widely,58 and some important
technology-exporting countries (the United States is a notable example) have no, or few agreements on the subject. Thus, a judgment
obtained in the state where the injury occurred may be difficult or
impossible to enforce in the state in which the exporting company is
located. In the United Kingdom, for example, the English rules of
indirect jurisdiction must be satisfied in order for a non-EEC foreign
judgment to be enforceable. These rules require that the judgment
debtor either be a resident of the foreign country or have submitted
to the jurisdiction of the foreign court.59 These requirements would
56. "In Bhopal, the complexities of distributing the money are much greater [than they
were in the Agent Orange case]. No proper record has been kept of the persons injured or
dead." Dhavan, supra note 15, at 305. "'Poor people don't know that they must get death
certificates .... That day, even at the cremation place, nobody was present to (record) names
and addresses. Five hundred people were cremated at a time in layers of bodies and logs."'
Kramer, supra note 7, at 10, quoting the superintendent of the Bhopal railroad police station.
57. Adler, supra note 6, at 71. Furthermore, according to the affidavit of Professor
Galanter filed in the U.S. Bhopal litigation, the Indian code of civil procedure provides for
"revisions", which can be sought by appeal during trial on the ground that the order appealed
from, "if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice." Id. (quoting from INDIA
CODE Crv. PROC. § 115). This is a broad standard indeed, and almost encourages interlocutory
appeals.
58. See FOREIGN RELATiONS RESTATEmENT, supra note 28, § 481, reporter's note 6,
summarizing the practice in a variety of countries.
59. See Schibsby v. Westenholz [1870] 6 Q.B. 155; Singh v. Rajah of Faridkote, App.
Cas. 670 (1894); and Emanuel v. Symon, 1 K.B. Div'I Ct. 302 (1908).
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seldom be satisfied in a products liability case against a foreign
exporter.
Even if there is no enforcement problem, however, defendant may
simply have insufficient assets to satisfy a judgment in a case involving a large number of victims. The Indian government has been
concerned about this possibility in the Bhopal case, and at one point
obtained an order, which has since been withdrawn, temporarily
restraining Union Carbide from reducing its assets below a level that
60
would be adequate to satisfy any judgment in the case.
A final post-trial problem, that of distributing any recovery, has
been touched upon earlier in connection with the problem of identification of victims. If victims are not identified and the appropriate
level of compensation for their injuries determined during the trial,
this process will further delay compensation of victims after the trial
has concluded.
The foregoing discussion has identified some of the features of the
litigation process that tend to delay the provision of compensation
to victims of mass disasters, particularly those involving imported
hazardous substances or technology. These factors also result in
tremendous costs to the defendant, the plaintiffs, and the judicial
systems of one or more countries. As discussed earlier, the most
efficient way in which to avbid these costs would seem to be to
establish in advance a mechanism that would process and pay, outside
of the litigation context, any claims that arise from a future accident.
The establishment of such a mechanism could be approached in
various ways, including the conclusion of a convention to which
technology exporting and importing countries would be parties; the
harmonization of the relevant laws and institutions of those countries,
perhaps through a "model law" to be prepared by an international
organization; and the inclusion of appropriate provisions in an agreement between the exporter and the importing country. Each of these
approaches has its own inherent problems, but it is submitted that
even an imperfect anticipatory compensation scheme holds more
promise than the present post hoc options.

60.

Sacramento Bee, November 30, 1986, at D4, col. 2, reporting that the Indian

government on November 29, 1986 accepted Union Carbide's offer to maintain "$3 billion in
assets to cover claims from the Bhopal tragedy ... ." On November 17, Judge G.S. Patel of

the Bhopal district court had ordered Carbide not to sell off assets or pay dividends. Id. See
also N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1986, at 6, col. 1; and Sacramento Bee, Nov. 18, 1986, at A6, col.
1. On Nov. 30, 1986, the judge lifted the injunction he had imposed on Nov. 17. Int'l Env.
Rptr. (BNA), Dec. 10, 1986, at 441.
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It has already been noted that lawsuits may result from a technology-related accident notwithstanding the existence of a pre-arranged mechanism. Any reform strategy should therefore anticipate
this eventuality, and should attempt to address not only obstacles
inherent in the judicial process, but also the kinds of disparities
described in part I. Possible methods of dealing with these problems
are outlined in part II.
II.

PROPosALS FOR EXPEDITING RELIEF

Part I of this study has surveyed the most prominent features of
the litigation process that tend to delay the provision of relief to
victims of mass disasters involving hazardous substances or technology which has been imported into the country where the accident
occurred. Part II will propose a variety of methods by which the
provision of relief might be. expedited.
The proposals developed in this part are based on the hypothesis
that two different but complementary approaches to expediting relief
are necessary. The first approach anticipates the possibility that an
accident may occur and provides for the establishment, in advance,
of institutions and mechanisms designed to ensure prompt and adequate compensation of victims. The second approach relates to post
hoc remedial efforts. It assumes that at least some claims arising
from an accident will be litigated (whether or not an applicable prearranged compensation scheme is in place) and addresses obstacles
inherent in the litigation process.
It is proposed that these two approaches be pursued simultaneously
via three types of instruments, or vehicles: model contractual provisions, a conventional regime, and a model law. Both the anticipatory
and the post hoc approach may coexist within one instrument and,
indeed, should be designed to be complementary. While each type
of vehicle has its own inherent advantages and disadvantages, a given
vehicle may not be suited to the solution of a specific kind of
problem. For example, harmonization of disparate standards of
liability could not be approached through a contract, unless a model
contract containing provisions on the subject were widely adopted.
In the sections that follow, the main features of each potential vehicle
will be described in broad outline.
Before turning to the specific proposals, however, it should be
emphasized that any approach to the problem under consideration
must be balanced if it is to succeed. Just as ignoring the problems
of hazardous technology is futile and potentially disastrous, so also
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deterring foreign investment through draconian measures serves no
one's interest. This article does not address the setting of safety
standards and other aspects of a broad strategy of accident prevention. 61 But any approach to the problem of promptly compensating
victims should be consistent with the larger goal of achieving a
balance between the maximum benefit and minimum detriment to
both the exporter and importing country. Or, as stated in various
international instruments concerning the regulation of the multinational enterprise, the objective should be to "encourage the positive

contributions which multinational enterprises can make to economic
and social progress and to minimize and resolve the difficulties to
which their various operations may give rise." 62
A.

Model Contract
Exporters of technology often enter into agreements with importing

countries, particularly when they plan to establish an affiliate there. 63

A state may choose to exclude totally the importation of certain
technologies, or may permit it subject to varying degrees of restrictions and conditions A'1 The state enjoys its greatest bargaining power
prior to authorizing the importation of the technology in question
or the establishment of the local affiliate, as the case may be. It
would therefore have good prospects for securing certain assurances
from the would-be exporter that would ensure, or at least facilitate,

61. See generally Natkin, Once isToo Often-CorporateResponsibility in the Aftermath
of Bhopal, WOrn, REsoucFas INsurtrra, JouRNAL '85, 62 (1985); and Pearson, What Has to
be Done to Prevent More Bhopas? WoRLD REsouRcEs INsr1JrE, JouR.NA '85, 58 (1985).
62. ORGANZATION FOR ECONOMc CO-OPERATION AND DE ELoPmT, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (1986); Dcr.AATIoN BY THE GovERNumNTS OF OECD MEmmER CouNTrlus
AND DECISIONS OF TBES
OECD CO=NC ON INTERNATIONAL INvEsTmdENT AND MuLTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES 11, § 2 (1976). This language is repeated in ECOSOC, Transnational Corporations:
Code of Conduct; Formulations by the Chairman 13 U.N. Doc. E/C.10/AC.2/8 13 (1978)
and INTmNATioNAL LABR ORoANrzATION, TRPARrrE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES CONCERNING
MULTINATIONAL ENTRRISES AND SOCIAL.Poc reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL. MATERIA S 422
(1978).
63. One study notes that the benefits from such agreements are not all one-directional.
The foreign MNE [multinational enterprise] investor is often desirous of an explicit agreement
to lend legal enforceability to the assurances on the part of the host government that guarantee
the investor the control he needs to ensure efficiency of operations. Moreover, it removes some
of the vagueness and uncertainties at the outset by defining the terms of the investment and
establishing a certain degree of responsibility, on the part of the host government, implicit in
the host's recognition of the investment. C. WALLACE, LEGAL CONTROL OF ma MuLTrNATIONAL
ENTERPRISE 72 (1982).
64. See generally id. chapters III (exclusionary techniques at entry) and IV (conditional
entry).
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the provision of compensation in the event of an accident.
Both the exporter and the importing country have incentives to
reach such an agreement. The possible difficulty of proving jurisdictional facts (a factor operating in the exporter's favor), coupled with
the possibility that jurisdiction will be found to exist in many cases
if such facts can be proven, as well as the exporter's amenability to
suit in its home country (factors operating in favor of the importing
country and the victims), make it desirable from the standpoints of
both parties to agree in advance upon a means of providing disaster
relief that does not involve the courts. That this did not prove
possible after the accident in the Bhopal case does not mean it would
not be possible and should not be considered prior to the importing
government's approval of the exporter's plans.
As discussed below, the exporter may well be willing to accept
potential liability in advance, even on a no-fault basis, if the extent
of liability is limited, rather than be excluded totally from the country
or run the risk of being subjected to a potentially ruinous judgment
in a lawsuit. Such a course should be more appealing to both the
exporter and the importing country, and would ensure provision of
compensation to victims much more rapidly than through litigation.
It would seem highly desirable that one of the many international
bodies that has been active in this field 6 standardize these kinds of
measures in the form of model contractual provisions, and promulgate them for possible utilization by importing or host countries.
Possible provisions to be included in such a model instrument will
be described generally in the following paragraphs. Many of them
could also take the form of provisions of a convention, and will be
alluded to in the discussion of that vehicle below. Measures designed
to avoid litigation will be discussed in the first section. In the event
that the parties cannot agree on such provisions, it is to be hoped

65.

These organizations include the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECO-

SOC), the United Nations Commission on Trade and Development (UNCITRAL), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the International Labor
Organization (ILO), the United Nations International Law Commission (ILC), and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). See the OECD, ECOSOC, and ILO documents cited
supra note 62; ECOSOC, Commission on Transnational Corporations, TransnationalCorporations and Issues Relating to the Environment Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc.,
E/C.1O/1986/15 (1986); OECD, OECD AND T ENtmoNmr (1986); UNCITRAL, Draft
Legal Guide on Drawing Up International Contracts for Construction bf Industrial Works,

Report of the Secretary General, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/VG.V/VP.20 and Adds.1-28, (1986);
ICC, GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL INVEsrTMNT (1974); see current work of the ILC on
International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts Not Prohibited by
International Law.
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that they can at least come to terms on rules applicable in the event
of litigation. The latter are discussed in the second section.

1. ProvisionsDesigned to Avoid Litigation
It perhaps goes without saying that any agreement between the
exporter and importing country should contain provisions relating to
the prevention of accidents. This subject is beyond the scope of the
present article, but it may be noted that issues such as the following

should be covered: Full disclosure of known risks, the extent to
which any relevant controls in the "exporting" country will apply,
and safety standards to be adhered to. 6
Second, and of greatest relevance to the present study, the agree-

ment should make provision for interim relief 67 and final compensation in the event of an accident. Perhaps the simplest and most
effective way to ensure that a fund of reasonable size will be available
for both interim relief and final compensation is to require the
exporter, at least under appropriate circumstances,6 8 to provide some

form of financial security, such as a bond or insurance, 69 which
would cover such needs (up to a certain limit) without regard to
fault. The "no-fault" feature is important because resolving disputes
as to whether the exporter or a local affiliate was negligent would

66. Many of these issues are involved in the debate over whether the "prior informed
consent" (PIC) of a prospective importing country should be required before the export of
hazardous substances or technology is allowed. See generally, Ashford and Ayers, Policy Issues
for Considerationin Transferring Technology to Developing Countries, 12 EcoLoGY L.Q. 871
(1985). For an argument against PIC, see the paper delivered by Michael Walls at the
Symposium on Development and the Environment (Dec. 4, 1987), forthcoming in N.Y.U.J.
INT'L L. & PoL. (1988). The environment ministers of the European Community recently
rejected prior informed consent as the basis for regulations concerning the import and export
of dangerous chemicals, opting instead for a regime of prior notification. 10 Int'l Env. Rep.
(BNA) 639 (Dec. 9, 1987). Cf. The Principles and Guidelines for the Safe Transfer of
Technology, European Council of Chemical Industry Federations (Apr. 15, 1987) (copy on file
with TIE TRANSNATIONAL LAWYER). Third world countries have succeeded in reopening the
issue of PIC in the context of the proposed London Guidelines of the United Nations
Environment Program (UNEP). The London Guidelines concern the exchange of information
on chemicals in international trade. 9 Int'l Env. Rep. (BNA) 435 (Sept. 9, 1987).
67. The interim relief order issued by Judge Deo in the suit against Union Carbide in
Bhopal, India has been hotly contested, and is under appeal as of this writing. 11 Int'l Env't
Rep. (BNA) 117 (Feb. 10, 1988). Judge Deo ordered Union Carbide to make a $270 million
payment for the interim relief of Bhopal disaster victims, and gave Carbide two months to
deposit the sum with the court. See also Stille, supra note 2, at 44.
68. See infra text accompanying note 90.
69. According to conversations the author has had with their officials, international
organizations working in this area have considered the idea of using some type of financial
security analogous to export performance bonds to gu~arantee that compensation will be
available in the event of an accident involving hazardous technology.
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consume precious time and other resources, and because victims must
be compensated even where there has been no negligence.70 It may
be appropriate in some circumstances, such as where a heavily
regulated plant is involved, for the importing country to join with

the exporter in providing financial security. Such a "partnership"
would help to encourage vigilance and care on the part of both
parties.

A U.N. Secretariat survey of state practice relating, inter alia, to
hazardous activities has recognized that this kind of insurance is not
unusual:
When a policy decision is made to allow the performance of certain
activities, knowing that they may cause injuries, efforts are made
to provide, in advance, guarantees for the payment of compensation.
The guarantees are in the form of requiring the operator of certain
activities to either carry insurance policies or provide financial
securities. Such requirements are similar to those stipulated in the
domestic laws of many states regarding the operation of complex
industries, as well as more routine activities such as driving and
7
maintaining a car. 1
The survey notes that "multilateral agreements have included provisions to secure the payment of compensation in case of harm and
liability,"' 72 and points out that "[m]ost multilateral agreements con-

70. The entity actually disbursing the funds in the event of an accident would be subrogated
to the victims' rights against the party at fault (e.g., a local subsidiary), if any. Subrogation
is commonly provided for in pollution-compensation arrangements and disaster relief schemes.
One example of a pollution compensation arrangement is the 1969 Civil Liability Convention.
See 1969 Civil Liability Convention, Dec. 18, 1971, 973 U.N.T.S. art. 5, at 3 reprinted in 9
Irrr'L LE(AL MA-TraIars 45, and in I B. RuEsm & B. SmunA, INTERNATIONAL PRoTEcTioN oF
TnErmomEaNT 405, at 470 (1975) [hereinafter 1969 Civil Liability Convention]. The
legislation enacted by the Italian government to provide relief for Seveso victims, (H. Smets,
Indemnisation des dammages, supra note 6, at 332 note 24 provides an example of a disaster
relief scheme.
It is because time is of the essence in providing compensation to victims that a "fault-witha-reversed-burden-of-proof" technique is not desirable. The Tanker Owner's Voluntary Agreement on Liability for Oil Pollution (TOVALOP) takes this approach rather than that of strict
liability. The effect of the liability provisions of that agreement is that there is a presumption
that the tanker owner was negligent, but this presumption can be rebutted on proof that the
discharge of oil from the tanker in question "occurred without fault on the part of the said
Tanker." TOVALOP, clause IV(B). See the discussion of this agreement in R. M'GoioLE &
M. ZACHER, POLLUTION, PoLrmcs, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: TANEs AT SEA 157-59 (1979)
[hereinafter M'GoNIGIE].
71. Survey of State Practice Relevant to International Liability for Injurious Consequences
Arising Out of Acts not Prohibited by International Law, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/15 at 211,
(1984) [hereinafter U.N. Survey].
72. Id. (emphasis in original) (referring to and quoting relevant provisions from the
Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, (May 25, 1962)), reprinted in I
B. RuEsTER & B. SfdMA, INTERNATIONAL PRoTEcTnoN oF THE ENVIRONMaENT 405 (1975)
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cerning nuclear activities are in this category." 73 Compulsory insurance has also been provided for in instruments relating to noxious

and hazardous substances. 74
A number of multilateral agreements relating to "ultrahazardous"
activities, including some of those just referred to, recognize several
important principles that apply equally to the subject presently under
consideration: First, that the activity in question is socially beneficial,
sometimes even essential; second, that the activity cannot be conducted without some risk that it will cause harm (and in some cases-

e.g., nuclear reactors-while the risk may be very slight, the potential
harm may be catastrophic); third, that such activities, because of
their social utility, should be protected from potentially ruinous
liability; 75 fourth, that in the case of an accident, fault may be very
difficult, impossible, or unduly time-consuming to prove; and finally,
that those suffering injuries as a result of the operation of such
activities should receive reasonable compensation. 76 These considerations have resulted in the establishment of conventional regimes
providing for strict but limited liability of those operating activities
entailing an unavoidable risk of harm, or those transporting hazardous or noxious substances.

[hereinafter Rum=], and in 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 268 (1962); the Vienna Convention on Civil
Liability for Nuclear Damage, U.N.T.S., Reg. No. 1-16197, reprinted in 2 INTL' LEGAL
MATEerazs 727 (1963); the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy
Reg. No. A13706, reprinted in 12 Ruster 5972, and in 55 Am. J. IzWL L. 1082 (1960),
Additional Protocol (Jan. 28, 1964); the Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft
to Third Parties on the Surface (Oct. 7, 1952), 310 U.N.T.S. 181; and the Draft Articles for
a Convention on Liability and Compensation in connection with the Carriage of Noxious and
Hazardous Substances by Sea (1981), IMO doc. LEG-XXXX=V.2.71 [hereinafter IMO Draft

Articles].
73. Id.
74. See IMO Draft Articles, supra note 72.
The provisions
75. State practice has provided for limitations on compensation ....
on limitation of compensation appear to have been carefully designed to fulfill two
objectives: to protect industries from unlimited compensation which financially
paralyzes their existence and discourages their future development, and to provide
reasonable and fair compensation to those who suffer injuries as the result of the
operation of those activities.
U.N. Survey, supra note 71, at 322. See e.g., 1969 Convention on Third Party Liability, supra
note 70, preamble.
Protection against potentially ruinous liability was also a basic rationale underlying the
United States' Price-Anderson Act, which was enacted in 1957 to encourage the nuclear energy
industry by limiting the liability of companies entering the field for damage caused by accidents.
A U.S. legislator has said that the Act is based on the twin assumptions that nuclear power
is "a central fact of American life" and that "nuclear accidents can happen." Remarks of
Rep. Edward J. Markey (Democrat of Massachusetts), 9 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) at 408 (Nov.
12, 1986).
76. See supra note 72.
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An example of such a regime is that established by the 1962
77
Brussels Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships,
which provides in Article II, paragraph 1, that such operators "shall
be absolutely liable for any nuclear damage upon proof that such
damage has been caused by a nuclear incident involving the nuclear
fuel of, or radioactive products or waste produced in such ship."
The Convention goes on to provide in Article III, paragraph 1, that
"[lthe liability of the operator as regards one nuclear ship shall be
limited to 1500 million francs 78 in respect of any one nuclear incident
....
" Paragraph 2 of the same article provides that an "operator
shall be required to maintain insurance, or other financial security
covering his liability for nuclear damage, in such amount, of such
type and in such terms as the licensing state 9 shall specify," and
further requires the licensing state to
ensure the payment of claims for compensation for nuclear damage
established against the operator by providing the necessary funds
up to the limit laid down in paragraph 1 of [Article III] to the
extent that the yield of the insurance or the financial security is
inadequate to satisfy such claims.
Thus, it is up to the licensing state to determine the amount of
insurance the operator must carry, but if the amount is less than
1500 million francs, that state is required to make up the difference.
Another example of a conventional regime providing for strict but
limited liability is the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability
for Oil Pollution Damage. 0 Under that agreement, shipowners are
strictly liable-subject to specified exceptions-for oil pollution damage occurring in the territory of a contracting state as a result of an
oil spill.8 ' A shipowner may limit this liability, however, provided
that the incident in question did not occur "as a result of the actual
fault or privity of the owner," 82 by "constitut[ing] a fund for the
total sum representing the limit of his liability [under Article V,

77. See supra note 70.
78. Article 111(4) defines the term "franc" as a unit of account constituted of a certain
weight and quality of gold.
79. Article 1(2) defines "licensing State" as "the Contracting State which operates or
which has authorized the operation of a nuclear ship under its flag."

80. 1969 Civil Liability Convention, supra note 70 at 3. See R. Quentin-Baxter, Fifth
report on international liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited
by international law, U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/383 and Add. 1, [1984] 2 Y.B. Imr'L LAW ComA'N

(Part One) 155, 157.
81. 1969 Civil Liability Convention, supra note 70, art. III.
82.

Id. art. V(2).
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paragraph 1 of the Convention]. ' -83 This fund may be constituted
through insurance or otherwise. The compensation regime of the

1969 CiMil Liability Convention is supplemented by the 1971 International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund
for Compensatibn for Oil Pollution Damage,84 which makes available
compensation fr oil pollution damage to the extent that the amount
provided for under the 1969 Convention is inadequate. 85 The Fund

is composed of contributions by persons receiving in contracting
states a specified amount of oil that has been transported by sea.

6

These instruments provide models for the kinds of provisions that
could be included in a contract between the exporter and the importing state. 87 thus tlhe contract could, under appropriate circumstances, provide, for strict but limited liability and could require the
exporter to provide some form of financial security to cover such
liability. The agreement should also provide for exculpating circumstances, such as armed hostilities, force majeure, or sabotage,8 and

might confine compensable harm to material damage.8 9
The question of the circumstances under which such an approach
would be appropriate is indeed a difficult one. 9° Situations can readily
83. Id. § 3. The limit of the shipowner's liability specified in Article V(1) is 2,000 francs
per ton of the ship's gross tonnage, not to exceed 210 million francs.
84. Signed at Brussels on Dec. 18, 1971, Iz;Ta-GovENmENTrL MARrumE CONSULTATIVw
ORoAmzAnro, U.N. Sales No. 1972.10.E, reprintedin 11 hur'L LEAr. MArmuAS 284 (1972)
[hereinafter 1971 Fund Convention].
.
85. The 1971 .Fund Convention also provides relief for shipowners who have complied
with relevant requirements, by requiring the Fund to indemnify them for a portion of their
liability under the 1969 Civil Liability Convention. Id. art. 5. See also arts. 2, 4, 10.
86. rd. art. i0.
87. Obviously, not all of the provisions mentioned in the preceding paragraphs would be
relevant to such a contract. For example, the "safety net" provisions of.the 1962 Convention
on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, supra note 72, requiring the licensing state to
make up any shortfall in compensation, and the provisions of the 1971 Fund Convention
would not be suitable for adaptation to model contractual provisions. These provisions were
noted, however, for the sake of completeness, and because they could provide inspiration for
a conventional regime, to be discussed below.
88. Cf. the circumstances enumerated in art. 3(2) of the 1969 Civil Liability Convention,
supra note 70. In this regard, it will be recalled that Union Carbide has alleged that sabotage
by an employee of the Bhopal plant was responsible for the accident. "Carbide says employee
sabotaged Bhopal plant," Sacramento Bee, 11 Aug. 1986, at 1, col. 1.
89. Such a limitation would make strict liability more acceptable to industry, and would
thus help to minimize any deterrent effect that such liability would have on exporters' interest
in going into a particular country. It would mean that such items of "damage" as pain and
suffering and non-economic losses would not be recoverable. The same would be true of
punitive damages. However, recovery for such items is either not allowed or is strictly limited
in virtually all jurisdictions other than the United States in any event. Moreover, it seems
clearly preferable to provide for an adequate recovery which is niade available expeditiously
than to hold out a promise of a lavish recovery which may be realized sometime years in the
future. See supra note 75.
90. See, e.g., the discussions in Schwartz, supra note 29, at 25; 'Westbrook, supra note
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be imagined in which the remoteness of the exporter's involvement
would make it unjust to impose strict liability. On the other hand,

a foreign exporter that is benefitting significantly from the production, sale, or use of the exported technology should not be permitted
to deny all responsibility for harmful consequences (at least foreseeable ones) of the export transaction. Admittedly, whether it is able
to do so will depend to a large extent upon the relative bargaining
positions of the exporter and the importing country. This is a
weakness of the contract approach and a corresponding strength of

the convention approach.
Whether the exporter should be held strictly liable or liable at all

in an individual case will depend upon a number of factors, including
the type of hazardous technology involved (e.g., a product, process,

plant, or a combination of these); the degree of hazard involved
(which is itself a difficult question since even commonplace objects
can cause harm if used improperly); the degree of the exporter's
involvement, ownership, and control; 9' the extent to which the exporter receives or has received benefits from the exported technology;

and the extent of regulation and control of the technology, including
any facilities, by the government of the importing country. 92

Of course, circumstances may lead the importing country to decide
to assume full responsibility for accidents arising out of imported
29, at 321; and Rubin & Stanley, A New Threat to the MultinationalEnterprise?J. CoM. 47A
(1985). Bruce A. Faizen, a lawyer for the government of India in the U.S. litigation put it
rather bluntly: .'we're saying it doesn't matter whether Carbide owned 50 percent of that
plant or 1 percent or 100 percent .... It was their operation. They set it in motion. They're
responsible."' India Sues in U.S. Court over Bhopal, Washington Post, April 9, 1985, at Al,
A14.
Compare the directive enacted July 25, 1985 by the Council of the European Communities
(EC) on the approximation of the laws, regulations, and administrative provisions of the
Member States concerning liabilityfor defective products28 O.J. Eua. Comm. (No. L 210) 29
(1985). This directive is based on the principle of strict liability of the producer for damage
caused by defective products. Id. art. 1. It provides for certain exculpating circumstances that
must be proven by the producer (id. art. 7), but does not impose a limit on damages recoverable
for death or personal injury. Certain derogations by member states are allowed. See the
discussion of the directive in Dielmann, The European Community's Council Directive on
Product Liability, 20 INT'L LAw. 1391 (1986). For surveys of product liability law in six
continental European and Nordic countries, as well as England and the United States, see
ASSOCIATION EUROPENE D'ETUDES JURIDIQUES ET FISCALES, PRODUCT LIABILIT

IN EUROPE

(1975).
91. This point is made in the paper by the chief outside counsel for Union Carbide in
the Bhopal litigation, supra note 29. But see the comments of Bruce A. Finzen, a lawyer for
the government of India in the U.S. litigation, quoted supra note 90.
92. See, e.g., the discussion of the regulation and control by the Indian federal and state
governments of the Union Carbide (India) plant at Bhopal in In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas
Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India. 634 F. Supp. 842, 863-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd in part sub
nom. Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster v. Union Carbide Corp., 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir.
1987) reprinted in 25 INT'L LnGoA MAatarx.s at 796-97.
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hazardous technology and, at least to the extent permitted by international human rights law, 93 it is certainly free to do so. But it seems
more likely that, at least initially, the importing country would argue
that it is not unfair to impose strict liability upon the exporter of
hazardous technology whatever the circumstances. This argument
could be based on the fact that the use of the technology, even as
intended, entails a risk of harm that is not feasibly avoidable, coupled
with the fact that the exporter benefits from the transaction (and
will probably derive continuing benefits therefrom).9 The financial
security required under a regime of the type under consideration
would become a business expense and would be reflected in the price
of the technology. As such, it would be capable of being taken into
account in advance by the exporter as a cost of doing business-a
situation that contrasts sharply with the potentially ruinous consequences of astronomical judgments. 95
In fact, experience in analogous fields has shown that industry is
willing to accept strict liability-and even to impose such liability on
itself-in order to demonstrate an appreciation of the problem in
question and to forestall the imposition of sterner measures by
governments. For example, in 1971 thirty-eight oil companies concluded the Contract Regarding an Interim Settlement of Tanker
Liability for Oil Pollution (CRISTAL) to supplement the 1969 Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage. CRISTAL, of
which 701 oil companies are now members, 96 accepts the strict (but
93. The constraints imposed by international human rights law upon a state's freedom to
endanger or sacrifice the health or safety of its citizens is discussed in D'AmATo & ENcEn,
STATE RESPONSIBIsTY rop Tm EXPORTATION oP NucLEAR PowER AND TECaNoLOGY (1986)
(unpublished at this writing).
94. Cf. the theory of "multinational enterprise liability" advanced by the government of

India in the U.S. Bhopal litigation, discussed in note 29, supra. Further, as mentioned in note
29, supra, the complaint filed by the Union of India against Union Carbide in the U.S.
Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York predicated Carbide's responsibility
on, inter alia, strict liability for an ultrahazardous activity. [Pending Litigation], Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 65870 (Oct. 1985). In a recent case in which one person was killed and
several hundred were hospitalized as a result of the collapse of a storage tank containing a

toxic chemical, the Indian Supreme Court stated that "the top management of any company
has an 'absolute' liability to ensure the safety of its facilities." 10 Int'l Env't. Rep. (BNA) 47

(Feb. II, 1987). The Court's holding in this case, which is under appeal, is being used by
lawyers for the Indian government in the Bhopal case. Id.
95. Cf. the OECD's "Polluter-Pays Principle," under which "the polluter should bear
the expenses of .carrying out ... measures decided by public authorities to ensure that the
environment is in an acceptable state. In other words, the cost of these measures should be

reflected in the cost of goo& and services which cause pollution in production and/or
consumption." OECD, Guiding Principles concerning International Economic Aspects of
Environmental Policies, §§ 2, 4 (recommendation adopted by the Council May 26, 1972),
reprinted in OECD, OECD AND T EmmoN~mEN 29 (1976).
96. 9 Int'l Env't. Rep. (BNA) 413 (Nov. 12, 1986).
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limited) liability of the 1969 Convention, subject to the defenses
contained in that convention. According to one study, "the actions
of the oil industry [in concluding TOVALOP 97 and CRISTAL] were
prompted by the hope that they would engender goodwill and that

states would, therefore, refrain from unilateral action and follow the
industry's precedent at the ensuing conference [on compensation for
oil pollution damage]." '98
Another study has concluded that the cost to industry of providing
compensation to cover accidental environmental damage "represents

a small fraction of the cost of measures to prevent environmental
damage .... ."99 The fact that "compensation payments are of minor
significance to industry"'1'' suggests that setting up a scheme, perhaps
involving insurance, to provide recompense for environmental dis-

asters caused by hazardous activities should not cause industry particular difficulty from an economic point of view.' 0'
As to whether it is appropriate to limit liability, experience has
shown that in order to be broadly acceptable, strict liability regimes
must provide for limitations on the amount of liability. This is true
not only of the conventional regimes discussed above, but also of
private compensation arrangements such as CRISTAL. It may be

said that an approach which limits the compensation payable to
victims is unjust. Every approach, however, has its price: The Bhopal

litigation demonstrates that seeking maximum possible recovery
through litigation means that victims will have to wait years before
even learning whether their lawsuits will be successful.1e 2 The ap-

97. See supra note 70.
98. M'GomoIGI, supra note 70, at 178. TOVALOP and CRISTAL have been criticized
on the ground, inter alia, that the liability limits they set are too low. On October 21 and 22,
1986, oil companies and tanker owners agreed on higher oil pollution compensation limits
under CRISTAL and TOVALOP. These "new voluntary limits are not as high as the latest
amounts agreed to by IMO [International Maritime Organization] member governments, but
they provide for a substantial increase in compensation .... The existing IMO conventions
[the 1969 Civil Liability convention, supra note 70, and the 1971 Fund convention, supra note
85] were updated in 1984 but will take some years to enter into force." 9 Int'l Env't. Rep.
(BNA) 412, 413 (Nov. 12, 1986). Incentive to ratify these agreements is diminished by the
increase in coverage under the private arrangements. By the same token, acceptance by exporters
of a strict but limited liability regime in contracts with importing countries could defuse
international pressure for imposing expanded liability, as well as even higher standards of
notification, supervision, and the like.
99. Smets, Compensation of Environmental Damage, supra note 6, at 9 (emphasis in
original).
100. Id. at 10.
101. See id. at 9.
102. According to Professor Marc Galanter, the average duration of each of the 18 tort
cases decided by the Supreme Court of India between 1950 and 1985, from the date of the

1988 / Hazardous Technology and International Tort Litigation
proach outlined above would ensure provision of adequate compensation to victims in an expeditious manner. This result would seem
more "just" than one which holds out the hope of an astronomical
recovery, but requires victims to bide their time for years before
learning whether that hope will be realized. In short, justice delayed
is justice denied.
If provision is to be made for a fund to satisfy claims, advance
agreement should be reached upon the machinery that will be used
to administer it. There is precedent under conventional regimes for
the utilization for this purpose of a court "or other competent
authority" of the state in which the accident occurred. 10 3 If this
model is followed (which may not be appropriate in the present
context, as discussed below), the Bhopal litigation teaches that time
and resources would be saved by designating a court or other body
in the importing state (the state where any accident would occur) as
the competent institution. °0 The exporter should consent to the
jurisdiction of the designated body for the limited purpose of implementing the contractual provisions concerning the compensation fund.
Where the exporter is a governmental entity, it should waive any
immunity from jurisdiction or enforcement that it may possess. Since
we are now dealing with a contract between the exporter and the
importing state and not a convention, jurisdiction of the courts *of
the importing state cannot be made exclusive: victims would be free
to sue the exporter in the courts of its home country. This is a
dispadvantage of the contract approach.
It is questionable, however, whether an exporting company would
generally be willing to submit in advance to the jurisdiction of the
importing country's courts. 0 The exporter might be more inclined
to agree to the use of a more neutral forum-again, for the limited

tort until the date of the final decision, was 17 and one-half years. "If applied to the Bhopal
case, that would mean relief wouldn't reach the victims until the year 2002," and that assumes
a favorable decision for the plaintiffs. Adler, supra note 6, at 71 (referring to Galanter's
affidavit in the U.S. Bhopal litigation.)
103. See 1969 Civil Liability Convention, supra note 70, art. IX; id. art. V, §§ 3, 7. Cf.
1962 Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, supra note 70, art. X(I),
calling for actions to be brought before the courts of the licensing state or of the state in
which nuclear damage was sustained.
104. Cf. 1969 Civil Liability Convention, supra note 70, art. IX.
105. The experience of Union Carbide with Indian courts and judges in the Bhopal litigation
does little to dispel exporters' concerns that courts in the importing country might be biased.
For example, one of the judges hearing the case was said to have been a plaintiff; and a judge
expressed the view to a reporter that Union Carbide had ignored its "obligations" as a
multinational company. See, e.g., 10 Int'l Env't. Rep. (BNA) 46 (Feb. 11, 1987).
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purpose of implementing contractual compensation provisions-such
as an ad hoc arbitral tribunal. The contract between the exporter
and the importing country could provide for such matters as the
venue of the arbitration, composition of the tribunal, rules to be
utilized (e.g., those of the International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC), the International Center for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID), or the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)), and applicable law. An accident
as serious as the one at Bhopal might justify the establishment of a
joint commission by the states from which and to which the technology was exported, and this possibility could be provided for in
the contract.
Regardless of the type of forum agreed upon, the body designated
in the contract should be granted broad fact-finding authority so
that victims can be identified rapidly and other pertinent facts can
be determined impartially while evidence is fresh.
.It will be noted that this approach avoids or minimizes a number
of obstacles present in the litigation process. Thus, potential problems
such as availability of affordable legal representation, court fees, and
attorneys' fees would presumably be less serious than where the
victims were forced to seek compensation directly from the exporter.
2. ProvisionsApplicable in the Event of Litigation
For various reasons, it may prove impossible for the exporter and
the importing state to agree upon provisions along the lines of those
described in the foregoing paragraphs. In that event, it would seem
quite important that the agreement at minimum address problems
that may arise if claims resulting from an accident are pursued
through litigation. Thus, some advance agreement should be reached
between the exporter and the importing country on such matters as
the amenability of the exporter to jurisdiction; the applicable rules
concerning the gathering of evidence; the possibility of establishing
impartial fact-finding machinery; which party would be liable for
costs and attorneys' fees; the applicable standard of liability; and
enforcement of any judgment(s).
A provision conferring jurisdiction of local courts or another
appropriate tribunal upon the exporter is necessary because of the
uncertainties in this regard discussed earlier in this article.Ie6 The

106.

See supra text accompanying notes 40-49. In the case of the Bhopal disaster, "ft]he
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conditions mentioned in that discussion might not always be satisfied,
and even if they were, they could be extremely difficult to proveespecially at a distance. This difficulty of proof would be magnified
if the forum did not allow liberal pre-trial discovery, as most nonU.S. jurisdictions do not. It is therefore probable that the state into
which the technology in question is to be imported would wish to
require reasonable assurances that the exporting company would be
amenable to the jurisdiction of an appropriate tribunal in the event
of an accident. Such assurances could be required as a condition of
allowing the technology to be imported, and could take the form of
an advance agreement by the exporting company that it would submit
to the jurisdiction of such a tribunal in the event of an accident. Of
course, whether an agreement of this kind can be struck between the
potential exporter and host country will depend upon the strength
of the parties' respective bargaining positions.
An issue to be addressed in formulating an agreement by the
exporter to submit to the jurisdiction of a claim-processing body is
whether such consent would be applicable only in the case of suits
by the government or also in the case of suits by injured individuals.
From the standpoint of the exporter, a single suit by the government
in its parens patriae capacity would seem much preferable to a
number of suits by private claimants, at least if under the applicable
law the government, by suing in such capacity, could represent the
entire class of injured parties and preclude other suits by injured
individuals.' °7 The Bhopal case suggests that the exporter would
probably attempt to condition its consent to jurisdiction upon the
state's agreement not to sue the company in its home country. The
political implications of such a lawsuit by the government would be
greater than those associated with private actions, however, and
might drive up an eventual settlement or judgment. Furthermore, it
may not be appropriate for the government to act as plaintiff because,
as has been claimed in the Bhopal case, the government itself may
have been at least partially responsible for the accident or extent of
the injuries.

Indians had been reluctant to sue Carbide in India in the first place because it was unclear
whether the government could get personal jurisdiction over the U.S.,based Union Carbide
Corporation-and not just over Union Carbide India, Ltd., which had insufficient assets to
satisfy a substantial judgment." Adler, supra note 6, at 72.
107. Cf. the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, which came into force
on March 18, 1985, reprinted in 25 IT'L LEGAL MATEnrAts 884 (1986). Relevant provisions
of the Act are described briefly supra note 4.
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On the other hand, the exporter would be unlikely to consent to
jurisdiction in actions by private individuals unless it could be given
some assurance that claims against it would somehow be consolidated.
Not only would consolidation spare the exporter from the burdens
of defending numerous separate actions and attempting to settle with
as many separate claimants, it would also expedite considerably the
provision of relief to victims. Consolidation could be effected through
procedural devices such as those available in the United States and
utilized in the Bhopal litigation.103
Another issue that might be covered by contractual provisions
applicable in the event of litigation is discovery. It has already been
seen in the context of the Bhopal litigation that U.S. and Indian law
with respect to discovery vary dramatically. This would very likely
be the case as to other technology exporting and importing countries
as well. Since it would not seem just to allow the exporter to escape
the more plaintiff-oriented rules of its own country, the preferred
solution would seem to be for the parties to agree that, to the extent
possible, the discovery rules most favorable to the victims should
apply in any proceedings resulting from an accident. 0 9 It may be
that such provisions would run afoul. of the public policy of the
importing country (if the proceedings took place there) or that special
legislation would be needed for their implementation. However, there
was no indication that either of these considerations was an obstacle
when the U.S. trial court dismissed the Bhopal litigation in favor of
an Indian forum on the condition, inter alia, that Union Carbide
"be subject to discovery under the model of the United States Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure . . . ."0 In any event, these would be

108. See In re Union Carbide Corp., Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India, 634 F.Supp.
842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) aff'd in part sub nom. Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster v. Union
Carbide, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1977), reprintedin 25 IN'L LEioAL MATEIUAmS at 772.

109.

The "most favorable law" principle is a part of the private international lav of the

Federal Republic of Germany (Article 12 of the Introductory Law to the German Civil Code,
EGBGB) as well as various other countries. See the comparative discussion of the laws of
twelve different jurisdictions in A. Rnsr, Thm MoRE FAVOURABLE LAW PRaNcipr iNTRNS-

RaoNTmR ENvmomEN1,m LAw 58-68 (1980). See also, e.g., SoERGEL-KEa", 7 KoMaMEmAR
INTERNAmTONALES PRuVATracHT 306 (4th
sum EGBGB 348, notes I et seq. (1970); G. KEa,
ed. 1977); and M. KELLER & K. SmER, ALLGmEmNE LEmRN DES INTERNMIONALEL PRIVATREcnrs 358-59 (1986). The recent changes to the German legislation on private international
law apparently left article 12 of the EGBGB, the source of the principle, unchanged. The
principle applies, inter alia, in tort cases in which the wrongful conduct and resulting injury
occur in different jurisdictions. In general, it provides that the applicable law is that of the
two jurisdictions which is most favorable to the plaintiff.

110. In re Union Carbide Corp., 634 F.Supp. at 867 reprintedin 25 INT'L LEGAL MATERIuS
at 802. This aspect of the trial court's decision was reversed by the Second Circuit Court of
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matters to be considered by the importing country in determining

whether to seek such a provision.
Finally, the contract between the exporter and the importing coun-

try should include a commitment by both parties to honor the
decisions of the tribunal agreed upon, where the proceedings in
question were instituted in accordance with the terms of the contract.
This was another of the conditions placed on the forum non conveniens dismissal of the U.S. Bhopal litigation by the trial court,"'

but it was struck down on appeal. 1' 2 Without such an agreement,
however, consent to jurisdiction might prove illusory. If a court in
the importing country is the tribunal agreed upon, the obligation to
abide by its judgments could be made subject to the kinds of
conditions contained in the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act of 1962.113
B.

Convention

To be successful, a convention designed to ensure rapid provision
of just compensation to victims of the types of accidents here under
consideration would have to be widely ratified by both technology
importing and exporting countries. (While the two are treated separately for discussion purposes, it is recognized that the same country
will often be both an importer and exporter of hazardous technology.)
The provisions of such a convention would therefore have to be

Appeals on Jan. 14, 1987 in 809 F.2d at 205 (2d Cir. 1987), reprintedin 10 Int'l .Env't. Rep.
(BNA) 45 (Feb. 11, 1987). The reason for the reversal was apparently that only Union Carbide,
and not India, was required to abide by U.S. discovery rules: "'Basic justice dictates that
both sides be treated equally, with each having equal access to the evidence in the possession
or under the control of the other."' 10 Int'l Env't. Rep. (BNA) 45 (Feb. 11, 1987).
111. 25 INVrL LEAL MATRnus 802.
112. Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster v. Union Carbide Corp., 809 F.2d 195 (2d
Cir. 1987), discussed in 10 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 45 (Feb. 2, 1987). The trial court judge's
condition provided as follows: "Union Carbide shall agree to satisfy any judgment rendered
by an Indian court, and if applicable, upheld by an appellate court in that country, where
such judgment and affirmance comport with the minimal requirements of due process ...."
In re Union Carbide Corp., 634 F.Supp. at 867 reprinted in 25 Ikt'L LEaG MArEuAts at
802.
113. 13 U.L.A. 271 (Master ed. 1975). The Act has been adopted in Alaska, California,
Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, Oklahoma, Texas, and Washington.
Section 4 of the Act requires that foreign country judgments meet certain conditions in order
to be entitled to recognition and enforcement. Among these conditions are that the judgment
was rendered in a legal system providing impartial tribunals "or procedures compatible with
the requirements of due process," and that the foreign court have had jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant and the subject matter of the action. The .judgment need not be
recognized if, inter alia, it was obtained by fraud, or violates the public policy of the forum
in which recognition is sought. Id.
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carefully balanced to take into account the interests of each group
of countries. Broad ratification would be important to the success
of this approach since exporters in countries that did not become
parties would be at a distinct advantage vis-4-vis exporters from
states ratifying the convention.
The convention should, of course, cover many issues other than
compensation of victims-in particular, those relating to prevention
rather than to remedies. 1 4 Problems in the former category are,
however, beyond the scope of this article. Also outside this article's
coverage is the crucial matter of defining the types of technology to
which the convention will apply. There is experience with the compilation of similar lists that should provide useful models, however. 1 5
This is another area in which international organizations active in
this field could render valuable assistance. The types of technology
covered by the convention would have significant bearing upon such
issues as whether and under what circumstances the exporter should
be held strictly liable. A definition of "hazardous technology" would
also be useful to importing states in determining whether and under
what conditions to allow the importation of certain products, processes, and the like.
Like the 1969 Liability and 1971 Fund conventions discussed above,
thie agreement here under discussion should anticipate the possibility
that accidents will happen and should provide for the expeditious
distribution of just compensation to victims. A convention would be
the most appropriate vehicle for the establishment of a generally
available mechanism-perhaps institutional-designed to assure the
expeditious provision of monetary or other relief to the victims of
an accident caused by exported hazardous technology. Another advantage of the convention approach, alluded to above, is that its
success does not depend upon the bargaining power of the importing
country vis-A-vis that of the exporter.

114. See generally McGarity, Bhopal and the Export of Hazardous Technologies, 20 Tax.

INT'L L.J. 333 (1985), discussing such problems as "industrial flight," the "circle of poison,"

and the question of whether technology-exporting countries should apply the same standards

to their corporations' foreign plants that they apply to those at home.
115. See, e.g., the list of hazardous wastes whose transfrontier movement will be controlled,
agreed upon by the Waste Management Policy Group of the OECD, Oct. 8-10 1986, reported

in Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 399 (Nov. 12, 1986); the annexes to the EEC's "Seveso Directive",
which attempt to define chemicals which, in certain quantities, are considered to be major
industrial hazards; and the Consolidated list of products whose consumption and/or sale have
been banned, withdrawn, severely restricted or not approved by Governments, U.N. Doc.
DIESA/WP/I.
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It might also be appropriate to envision another, less ambitious
conventional regime, whose objective would be to take some of the
twists and turns out of the litigation process with a view to expediting
the provision of relief to victims. This- section will outline with a
very broad brush the kinds of remedial provisions these two types
of conventional regimes might contain.
1. Regime to Provide Compensation Outside the Litigation
Process
Many of the provisions discussed in the preceding section, relating
to model contractual clauses, would also be desirable features of a
conventional regime. For ease of reference, these will simply be listed
here: Strict liability of exporters of hazardous technology, under
appropriate circumstances 16 and subject to appropriate exculpatory
provisions; limitation of the monetary extent of liability; a requirement that exporters (perhaps jointly with the importing country under
appropriate circumstances) provide some form of financial security
to cover potential liability;" 7 the establishment or identification of
an impartial body in the importing country that would be responsible
for identifying victims, determining the cause(s) of the accident, and
administering the payment of claims; and a requirement that exporters
submit to the jurisdiction of such a body for the limited purpose of
implementing the provisions concerning the compensation fund." 8
These provisions could be adapted from conventions such as those
discussed in relation to the model contract." 9
The convention should be drafted in such a way as to obligate the
states parties not to allow the importation of hazardous technology
unless the exporter complies fully with the convention's terms. Thus,
if state A, a party to the convention, allowed the importation of
hazardous technology by company X without requiring that company

116. See the discussion of some of the considerations that would be relevant to determining
the appropriateness of strict liability in text accompanying supra note 52.
117. As to this requirement, as well as that below concerning the submission of the exporter
to the jurisdiction of the importing country's courts, the convention could provide that
contracting parties exporting hazardous technology are obligated to require their companies to
comply with such requirements as a condition of allowing the technology to be. exported.
118. Such submission could be provided for in the manner described in the preceding
footnote. It should include a waiver of immunity where the exporter is a governmental entity.
119. E.g., the 1962 Brussels Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships,
supra note 72; the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage,
supra note 70, and the 1971 International Convention on the Establishment of an International
Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, supra note 84.

The TransnationalLawyer / Vol. 1

to, e.g., provide financial security for the compensation of potential
accident victims, this would constitute a breach of the treaty in
respect of other states' parties.
The convention should also confer exclusive jurisdiction over accident claims upon the body in the importing country, such as a
court or an ad hoc arbitral tribunal, which has been designated to
handle the claims. Such a provision, which would not be possible in
a model contract, would preclude victims from suing in the exporter's
home country (providing, of course, that that country was a party
to the convention). While this might be challenged on due process
or other grounds, there is precedent for such a provision under, e.g.,
the 1969 Civil Liability. Convention, discussed above.12° Furthermore,
since it is designed to expedite the provision of compensation, rather
than to deprive victims of it, such a provision should not be objectionable.
Disasters of great magnitude, such as Bhopal, may call for the
establishment of extraordinary tribunals. In such situations, the exporter's home state and the importing country could, by special
agreement, set up a joint claims settlement tribunal that would
determine the amount of compensation to which individual victims
were entitled.' 2' The possibility that such special tribunals might be
needed in the case of mass disasters could also be provided for in
the convention here under discussion.
As a safeguard measure, and in particular where a court is the
body designated to handle claims, the convention should provide for
enforcement in the exporter's home state of any judgment rendered
pursuant to its terms in an importing state (assuming again that both
states are parties to the convention). Such a provision could be
modeled on Article X of the 1969 Liability Convention.
Provision should also be made in the convention for a supplementary accident victims' compensation fund ("Fund"), perhaps modeled
along the lines of that established by the 1971 Fund Convention.2'2
The Fund could thus be available to provide compensation to the
extent that the moneys supplied by the exporter's insurance, bond,
or other financial security were inadequate.'2 A portion of it could
120.
121.

See text accompanying notes 80-86, supra.
Such a proposal for dealing with the claims arising out of the Bhopal disaster has

been made by Professor Daniel Magraw, as described supra note 8.
122.

See supra note 84.

123.

Like the 1971 Fund Convention, the present instrument could also provide relief for

exporters who have complied with relevant requirements, by requiring the Fund to indemnify

them for a portion of their liability under the convention.
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also be set aside for victims (including the unborn) whose injuries
are not immediately apparent or are unforeseeably and dramatically
worsened over time. The Fund could be composed of contributions
by, e.g., exporters headquartered in contracting states; persons receiving in contracting states a specified amount of the product of
the hazardous technology that was exported; and perhaps the contracting states themselves. States could finance such contributions in
part through a tax or charge on the hazardous technology that they
permitted to be exported or imported. This might provide an additional incentive for states to exercise care in allowing hazardous
technology to enter or .leave their borders.
Another approach to making up a shortfall in compensation is
that taken by the 1962 Convention on the Liability of Operators of
Nuclear Ships.' 24 It will be recalled that that Convention leaves it up
to the state licensing a nuclear ship to specify the amount, type, and
terms of the required insurance or other financial security, but
obligates that state to make up the difference between the amount
of coverage it requires and the ceiling provided for by the Convention.
This approach might make more sense where the activity in question
is normally owned and operated by the states themselves-as is the
case with nuclear ships. It seems doubtful under present conditions
that technology exporting states would be ready to back private
exporters in the way envisaged by the 1962 Convention.
2. Regime to Eliminate Obstacles in the Litigation Process
The establishment of a separate conventional regime to deal with
problems related to the litigation process would also be desirable.
Because it is post hoc in nature, this is not the preferred method of
.dealing with the problem of facilitating redress. Nonetheless, it is
doubtful that all of the many existing arrangements involving hazardous technology that has already been exported could be subjected
retroactively to a regime such as that outlined in Section One, above
(although this would no doubt be possible as contracts expire and in
relation to ongoing arrangements).
A conventional regime addressing obstacles in the litigation process
should address many of the same kinds of issues as those mentioned
above in relation to model c6ntractual provisions applicable in the
event of litigation. It need not and should not be strictly confined

124.

See supra note 72.
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to harmonization of procedural rules, however, since this would leave
several major problems unaddressed. Thus, some advance agreement
should be reached between states importing and exporting hazardous
technology on such matters as those identified in the following
paragraphs.
First, the convention should designate the state in which victims
may bring actions.'2 For the reasons given in Judge Keenan's opinion
in the U.S. Bhopal litigation, the forum designated should probably
be the importing country, which would also be the place of the
accident. Such a provision would require implementing legislation in
order to ensure that any actions which plaintiffs sought to bring
against the exporter in its home state would be dismissed in favor
of the importing country.
Second, a procedure for the consolidation of claims should be
established. The convention could set up such a procedure or could
simply incorporate by reference a consolidation procedure established
by the laws of a particular state.
Third, the convention should specify the applicable rules concerning
the gathering of evidence. Here, the convention could set up its own
regime or allow the court to avail itself on motion and at its discretion
of the system most favorable to the plaintiff(s), as between that
.revailing in the importing or the exporting country. In order to
facilitate access to evidence and witnesses located abroad, the convention should require or strongly encourage parties to ratify the
26
Hague conventions on the taking of evidence and service of process.
Fourth, the parties should seek to identify or provide for the
establishment of impartial fact-finding machinery. As described earlier in this article, 127 the establishment of basic facts has been problematic and productive of delays in the Bhopal case. From such basic
problems as identifying victims to more complex matters like determining what happened at the plant, Bhopal has demonstrated what

125.

Cf. Art. IX of the 1969 Civil Liability Convention, supra note 70, which designates

the state -in which pollution damage has occurred as the sole state in which actions for
compensation may be brought. Cf. also rfote 50, supra, concerning the power of a government
to extinguish claims: legislation which merely required, in effect, a transfer to another forum-

much like that effected pursuant to a conditional dismissal for reasons of forum non
conveniens-would seem far less objectionable.
126. See the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, supra note 46; and
the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil
or Commercial Matters of Nov. 15, 1965, entered into force Feb. 10, 1969, 20 U.S.T. 361,
T.I.A.S. 6638, 658 U.N.T.S. 163.
127. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
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an enormous and difficult task fact-finding can be with regard to
mass disasters. There is also the question of whether a party who is

alleged to bear at least a share of the responsibility for an accidenthere the Indian government-should be involved in the fact-finding
process. But clearly the court cannot shoulder this burden, and the
parties can only do it at great cost and with much loss of time.
Perhaps an existing international organization (preferably non-gov-

ernmental) such as the Red Cross could be asked to take on the
responsibility of the identification of victims in cases approaching
the magnitude of Bhopal. And perhaps it would not be too far
fetched to envisage the establishment of an International Hazardous
Technology Agency, very roughly analogous to the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),lu which would be competent, among
other things,' 29 to investigate the causes of disasters involving exported

hazardous technology. 130
Fifth, the convention should specify which party will be liable for

costs and attorneys' fees. The objective here should be to avoid
deterring victims from seeking compensation through what might
prove to be the only avenue available: litigation. If plaintiffs are
faced with an ad valorem court fee such as that reportedly imposed

in India,' 3 ' they may not get past the court's threshold. Parties to
the convention should therefore be called upon to eliminate such fees
in the type of case under consideration, insofar as possible. With
regard to attorneys' fees, a "loser-pays-all" rule would doubtless
deter some plaintiffs with legitimate claims. This suggests that each
party should bear its own attorneys' fees. Perhaps some form. of
assistance to indigent plaintiffs could be provided through a fund to
be set up under the convention, discussed below.

128. See Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 8 U.S.T. 1093, TIAS 3873,
276 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force July 29, 1957). It goes without saying that it is not here
suggested that the "hazardous technology agency" be concerned with safeguards against the
diversion of hazardous material, as is the IAEA in respect of fissionable material; such an
agency could however, like the IAEA, promote cooperation among importing and exporting
states in the use and socially beneficial application of, in this case, hazardous technology.
129. See supra note 128. Such an agency could also make generally available information
concerning regulations imposed in exporting states upon the production and use of hazardous
technology, as well as such matters as safety regulations in and around plants producing or
using such techfiology.
130. It is recognized that a state in which such a disaster occurred might not be willing to
grant the agency free rein in conducting its investigation. Cf. the IAEA's efforts to investigate
the circumstances and effects of the accident at Chernobyl. But even a modicum of investigatory
authority in a neutral body would be of great assistance in expediting the provision of
compensation to victims, and would probably help to "keep the parties honest" in the conduct
of their own investigations.
131. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.

The TransnationalLawyer / Vol. 1
Sixth, the applicable standard of liability should be determined.
As discussed in several places in this article, agreement on a standard
of liability, and if possible, on strict liability, would save a great
deal of time, money, and judicial resources. Otherwise, it is not only
time that will be lost in deciding which state's law and what standard
of liability to apply. If a fault-based standard is employed, problems
of proof may be insurmountable. If parties do agree upon strict
liability, however, some limitation should be placed upon the monetary extent of liability for reasons discussed above.
Seventh, provision should be made for enforcement of judgment(s).
The convention should provide that any judgment rendered pursuant
to its provisions is to be recognized and enforceable in any other
13
contracting state, subject to the usual qualifications. 2
Finally, the convention could provide for the establishment of a
fund for meeting the legal and court costs of indigent plaintiffs (or
court costs could simply be waived in the case of mass disasters).
C. Model Law
A model law would probably be a less effective approach to
expediting relief than those already discussed because of the possibility that states would modify a model law in the process of enacting
it, thus reducing the extent of harmonization it could effect. There
would also be less collective international pressure upon individual
states to enact such a measure than would be present at an international conference for the conclusion of a treaty, as well as more
parochial political pressure to be responsive to local concerns and
interests. Furthermore, the incentive to "hold out" by not enacting
the model law would be significant since states that did not enact
the law would enjoy certain advantages over those that did. This is
particularly true of importing states, but as already noted, many
states are both importers and exporters of hazardous technology.
Nonetheless, some relief-expediting measures are well suited to
implementation through uniform legislation, and one or more of the

132. See, e.g., the 1969 Civil Liability Convention, supra note 70, art. X(l) which requires

that the judgment "no longer [be] subject to ordinary forms of review" in the state of
rendition, that it not have been obtained by fraud, and that the defendant have been given
reasonable notice and a fair opportunity to present his case. The article contains another
desirable provision in paragraph 2, namely, that the formalities for enforcing judgments in
the state in which enforcement is sought "shall not permit the merits of the case to be reopened."
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international bodies active in this field 33 could propose such a
measure for adoption by states importing hazardous technology, as
well as a separate one suitable for adoption by states exporting such
technology (as noted above, the two categories of states are treated
separately for analytical purposes, even though the same state may
be both an importer and an exporter). Illustrative provisions of such
model laws, most of which are adapted from like provisions in the
instruments already discussed, follow.
1.

Model Law for States Exporting Hazardous Technology

Model legislation designed for adoption by exporting states should
address the following points.
First, exclusive jurisdiction should be conferred upon a designated
tribunal. As discussed earlier, it is essential that time not be wasted
litigating the questions of jurisdiction and the appropriate forum.
The latter question alone consumed over seventeen months in the
Bhopal litigation. The advantages of holding the proceedings at the
situs of the accident have been adverted to above; while important
evidence and witnesses may be located at the exporter's headquarters, 34 it would usually be more efficient to transport these to the
scene of the accident than vice versa. Judge Keenan so found in the
135
U.S. Bhopal litigation.
Second, provision should be made for enforcement of judgments.
This provision could parallel the one discussed above in connection
with the conventional regime concerning litigation-related obstacles
36
to relief.
Third, cooperation between judicial authorities should be provided
for. The model law designed for the exporting country could usefully
provide for such forms of judicial assistance as service of process
and taking of evidence in the case of litigation abroad -concerning
accidents caused by hazardous technology exported from the country
in question. These provisions could be modelled upon those of the
137
Hague conventions on the taking of evidence and service of process.

133. See supra note 65.
134. See, e.g., the allegations of the plaintiffs (including the government of India) in the
U.S. Bhopal litigation, discussed by Judge Keenan in his opinion, In re Union Carbide Corp.,
634 F.Supp. at 847; 25 INV'L LEGAL MAXERiAls at 783, et seq.
135. Id.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59.
137. See the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, supra note 46; The
Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents, supra note
126.
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In the case of legislation, however, there would obviously be no
automatic reciprocal assistance provided for in importing countries,
as would be the case with a treaty regime (to the extent such countries
were parties).
2. Model Law for States Importing Hazardous Technology
First, such a law should provide for the consolidation of claims.
In addition to the features of such a provision already discussed,'
a suggestion by Professor Galanter is worthy of consideration: The
model law could provide for "a single consolidated proceeding to
determine common questions (for example, liability) and special
tribunals to make individualized determinations of damages....- 3 9
Second, provision should be made for strict liability with a ceiling
on recoverable damages, along the lines already discussed.' 40
Third, the law should require that exporters provide some appropriate form of financial security to cover potential liability. This
requirement, discussed above in relation to model contractual provisions, should be imposed upon the exporter at entry, i.e., when
the importing country authorizes the importation of the hazardous
technology.
Model legislation designed for importing countries could contain
many other kinds of provisions directed toward streamlining the
provision of compensation, some of which have been mentioned in
connection with the discussion of other instruments. For example, a
fund for the compensation-supplementa or otherwise-of victims
of accidents involving hazardous technology could be established by
the importing country as a part of its general budget. Complex
legislation was introduced in the United States "to provide prompt,
exclusive, and equitable compensation, as a substitute for inadequate
tort remedies, for disabilities or deaths resulting from occupational
exposure to asbestos, and for other purposes.' 1 41 This legislation,
which died when the asbestos cases were settled, would have established a compensation fund composed of assessments levied upon
defendants in asbestos cases, and supplemented by a trust fund to
which the government would contribute appropriated moneys. While

138.
139.
140.
141.

See the discussion supra under part II(B)(2)(b).
Galanter, supra note 15, at 294.
See the discussion of these points supra parts 11(A), (B).
See supra note 6.

1988 / Hazardous Technology and International Tort Litigation
they are thus somewhat unique, these bills might serve as a partial
model. A system analogous to that of workers' compensation might
also be envisaged, with the government or insurance carrier being
subrogated to the victim's rights against the party at fault.
The law could further provide for legal representation of victims,
and for the compensation of lawyers. Professor Galanter has suggested that the latter problem could be addressed by "devising a
revolving fund that would pay for legal services and be replenished
from recoveries."' 142 It could further provide for the establishment or
identification of an impartial body in the importing country that
would be responsible for identifying victims, determining the cause(s)
of the accident, and administering the payment of *claims. And it
could require that exporters submit to the jurisdiction of such a body
for the limited purpose of implementing the provisions concerning
the compensation fund. 143 These provisions could be adapted from
conventions such as those discussed in relation to the model contract. 144

CONCLUSION

It is crucial that action be taken to streamline the provision of
compensation to victims of mass disasters, and in particular, accidents
involving exported hazardous technology. Ideally, such action should
be taken in a concerted manner, and on the international, state-tostate level. It is perhaps more realistic to expect that such reforms
will be effected, if at all, through agreements between exporters of
hazardous technology and importing countries. Countries importing
hazardous technology probably enjoy sufficient bargaining leverage
to demand certain assurances from exporting companies as a condition of permitting the importation of the hazardous technology.
These assurances should include the provision of some form of nofault financial security to ensure the availability of at least some
compensation for potential accident victims, agreement to submit to

142. Galanter, supra note 15, at 294. Such a solution would apparently entail some of the
elements of contingent fees-i.e., there would have to be recoveries (i.e., plaintiffs would have
to prevail), and part of the recovery would go to the lawyers. While these features may be
objectionable in some countries on policy grounds as discussed earlier, the main concern should
be the provision of legal representation for victims. See also the solution proposed by Magraw,
supra note 8: "Attorneys' fees would be limited to 10% of the amount actually received by
each claimant." Id. at 846.
143. See the above discussion of similar provisions in relation to a conventional regime.
144. These conventions are referred to supra in the text accompanying notes 75-88.
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the authority of a local court or other competent body in the
importing country, and other stipulations to implement those mentioned. Ultimately, however, if the benefits of hazardous technology,
which can be great, are to be distributed to countries throughout the
world, a widely accepted international regime that ensures compensation for its victims, yet does not destroy or discourage its producers,
seems essential.

